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In the first chapter, I develop a quantitative small-open-economy model to assess the
optimal pace of foreign reserve accumulation by developing countries. The model features
endogenous growth with foreign direct investment (FDI) entry and sudden stops of capital
inflows to incorporate benefits of reserve accumulation. Reserve accumulation depreciates
the real exchange rate and attracts FDI, which endogenously promotes productivity growth.
When a sudden stop happens, the government uses accumulated reserve to prevent a severe
economic downturn. The calibrated model shows that two factors are the key determinants of
the optimal pace of reserve accumulation: the elasticity of the foreign borrowing spread with
respect to debt, and the entry cost for FDI. The model suggests that these two factors can
explain a substantial amount of the cross-country variation in the observed pace of reserve
accumulation.
The second chapter is a joint work with Felipe Saffi e. In this chapter, we develop a small-
open-economy model with endogenous firm and trade dynamics. Aggregate productivity of
the economy increases through new firm entry and incumbent firms’innovation. Firms in-
vest in two types of innovation: innovation to acquire new product lines, and innovation to
start exporting their products. These innovation activities determine the extensive margins
of imports and exports. The economy is also subject to sudden stops of capital inflows.
The model can capture some of the empirical regularities of firm and trade dynamics during
sudden stops: firms’innovation drops sharply, which causes a persistent decline in productiv-
ity and output; imports of goods decline substantially, while exports are almost unaffected;
profits for exports increase due to a large real depreciation and lower production cost; the
extensive margin of exports gradually expands after sudden stops. The model provides a
tractable framework to study optimal capital policies in the context of endogenous firm and
trade dynamics.
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1 Reserve Accumulation, Foreign Direct Investment,
and Economic Growth
1.1 Introduction
The active accumulation of foreign reserves by developing countries, especially those in East
and Southeast Asia, is one of the most prominent developments in the international financial
system in the past 25 years. The left panel in Figure 1.1 shows that the average reserve-
to-GDP ratio across 67 developing countries has increased from less than 10% before 1990
to almost 25% by 2010. While many developing countries have built up reserve holdings
in this period, there is a wide cross-country variation in how quickly these countries have
accumulated reserves. The right panel in Figure 1.1 shows the average annual increase in
reserve holdings as a percentage to GDP across developing countries in 1991-2010. It can be
observed that Asian countries such as China, Malaysia, and Thailand have been accumulating
reserves equivalent to 3.5-5% of GDP per year on average, while many Latin American
countries are accumulating reserves less than 1% of GDP per year. Although the optimal
reserve policy has been an active research area and a central policy question throughout the
past decade, we still know little about the optimal pace of reserve accumulation, and why
different countries accumulate reserves at different rates.
This chapter develops a quantitative small-open-economy model to study the optimal
pace of reserve accumulation by developing countries. The main novelty of this chapter is
twofold. First, the model incorporates the key benefits and costs of reserve accumulation
1
Figure 1.1: Reserve Accumulation by Developing Countries


































































































































into a quantitative framework. On the benefit side, the existing literature has identified two
benefits of reserve accumulation: a growth-promoting effect and a precautionary effect. The
growth-promoting effect goes through depreciating the real exchange rate and attracting
foreign direct investment (FDI). The precautionary effect is that reserve holdings help to
stabilize the economy in the face of volatile capital flows. Most existing theoretical papers
studying optimal reserve policy incorporate only one of these effects. On the cost side, reserve
accumulation crowds out domestic investment.1 The second novel contribution is that this
chapter addresses why different countries accumulate reserves at different paces, instead
of trying to identify the unique optimal pace of reserve accumulation for a representative
developing country.
The model is a small open economy with tradable and non-tradable sectors. The economy
starts with scarce capital, accumulates capital by borrowing from abroad, and grows rapidly.
The focus of the model is how reserve policy should be conducted during this transition
1Crowding-out of investment resulting from reserve accumulation is documented by Reinhart, Reinhart,
and Tashiro (2016) at the macro level, and empirically shown by Cook and Yetman (2012) at the micro level.
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period. To capture the two benefits of reserve accumulation mentioned above, I introduce
two features into the model: endogenous growth with FDI entry and sudden stops of capital
inflows. Endogenous growth is introduced to study the growth-promoting effect of reserve
accumulation. The model framework is a version of the Schumpeterian growth model in
which intermediate goods-producing firms endogenously innovate and increase aggregate
productivity. I introduce FDI into the framework in order to capture the idea that reserve
accumulation promotes growth in part by attracting FDI.2 Sudden stops are introduced
to capture the precautionary effect of reserve holdings. Sudden stops are modeled as an
occasionally binding borrowing constraint on private debt and working capital financing.
The government reserve policy consists of two interventions. First, in normal times when
the borrowing constraint is not binding, the government collects taxes at a fixed rate to ac-
cumulate reserves. Reserve accumulation causes real depreciation, which in turn shifts more
labor to the tradable sector and reduces the real wage. This brings higher profits for interme-
diate firms, which induces more innovations and attracts FDI. Second, when the borrowing
constraint binds, the government provides accumulated reserves to mitigate the shock to
output, consumption, and investment. I call this intervention a bailout by the government.
Since investment in innovation and FDI entry are forward-looking decisions, anticipation
of future bailouts also induces investment in innovation and attracts FDI. Through these
two interventions, the reserve policy achieves high and stable growth of the economy. The
optimal pace of reserve accumulation is determined by the fixed tax rate that maximizes the
expected utility of households.
2Dooley et al. (2007, 2014) argue that Asian countries’growth strategy is to repress the real wage by
foreign exchange rate intervention and to attract FDI.
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The reason why the reserve policy may improve welfare is because private agents do not
internalize that their actions affect FDI entry decisions, and the reserve policy corrects this
externality. The main benefit of receiving FDI is that foreign firms invest more in innovation
than domestic firms and therefore contribute to productivity growth.3 In order to attract
FDI, the country can increase the growth rate by investing more in capital and shifting more
labor to the tradable sector, which increases profits for foreign firms. Avoiding sharp drops
in foreign firms’profits during sudden stops also helps to attract FDI. The reserve policy
corrects the externality by bringing about more investment and a labor shift to the tradable
sector in normal times, and by preventing a severe economic downturn during sudden stops.
On the other hand, reserve accumulation involves costs. As government collects tax
revenue to accumulate reserves, private agents borrow more from abroad to compensate for
the loss of resources. In the model, the interest rate on foreign borrowing is debt-elastic,
and the larger debt-to-GDP ratio increases the interest rate spread. The debt-elastic spread
causes two costs of reserve accumulation. First, it prevents a full offset by private agents,
thus lowering consumption in the short run. The optimal reserve policy therefore balances
the costs of short-run austerity with the benefits of higher long-run consumption. Second,
the higher spread discourages investment in capital and innovation, a form of crowding out.
This reduces the growth-promoting effect of reserve accumulation and worsens the trade-off
between current austerity and future consumption.
In the quantitative analysis, I calibrate the model to a sample of eight developing coun-
tries. I target the productivity gain from FDI entry, the innovation rate of foreign firms
3Arnold and Javorcik (2009) and Guadalupe, Kuzmina, and Thomas (2012) show that foreign firms invest
more in innovation than domestic firms in Indonesia and Spain respectively.
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relative to domestic firms, and the value added share of foreign firms in the tradable sector,
all from empirical papers. The frequency and duration of sudden stops are derived from
sudden stop episodes for a sample of 33 countries over the period of 1980-2009. I solve the
model globally using a version of the policy function iteration algorithm to deal with the
occasionally binding borrowing constraint.
The first important result using this model is that the optimal pace of reserve accumu-
lation and its welfare impact crucially depend on two characteristics of each country: the
debt-elasticity of the foreign borrowing spread, and the FDI entry cost. In countries with
a higher debt-elasticity of this spread, reserve accumulation causes severe crowding-out of
investment, which reduces the growth-promoting effect. In countries with a larger FDI entry
cost, reserve accumulation is not as effective in attracting FDI and the growth-promoting
effect is therefore limited. In these cases, the optimal pace of reserve accumulation is slower,
and the welfare gain is limited. The decomposition analysis shows that 72% of the growth-
promoting effect of the reserve policy comes from real depreciation in normal times, and
28% comes from anticipation of future bailouts during sudden stops. The model also shows
that reserve accumulation without bailouts cannot improve welfare, because without bailouts
private agents do not increase foreign borrowing to compensate for the loss of resources as
much, and thus reduce short-run consumption substantially.
Given these results, I evaluate each developing country’s pace of reserve accumulation
accounting for these two factors. I empirically estimate the debt-elasticity of the spread
using panel regression for a sample of 22 developing countries. I find that a country’s
default history is significantly and positively associated with its elasticity of the spread with
respect to debt. Accordingly I divide the 22 sample countries into 5 groups according to
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the number of past defaults, and estimate the elasticity for each group by interacting the
debt-to-GDP ratio with dummy variables representing the default history. I also adjust the
parameters for the FDI entry cost to match the FDI inflow-to-GDP ratio for each country.
Using this model, I derive the optimal pace of reserve accumulation for each country, and
compare it with the actual pace of reserve accumulation. The second important result is
that many developing countries are roughly in line with the optimal pace suggested by the
model, suggesting that these two factors can explain the observed cross-country variation in
the pace of reserve accumulation. The correlation between the actual and optimal pace of
reserve accumulation across 22 countries is 0.54. A few countries including China, however,
seem to be accumulating reserves too quickly. This result may suggest that there is some
other benefit of reserve accumulation in China and other countries that is not captured by
the model in this chapter.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 1.3 introduces the model. Section 1.4 discusses the mechanisms of how
the reserve policy works in the model. Section 1.5 presents the calibration of the model
and the quantitative analysis. Section 1.6 studies the key determinants of the optimal pace
of reserve accumulation. Section 1.7 evaluates the actual pace of reserve accumulation by
developing countries. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Foreign reserve accumulation by developing countries has been an active research area in the
last decade. One strand of literature focuses on the growth-promoting effect. As an empirical
6
motivation, Aguiar and Amador (2011) find that there is a positive correlation between
government net foreign asset growth and GDP growth across developing countries, which is
in stark contrast to the prediction of neo-classical growth models. Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2013) show that this correlation is driven mainly by reserve accumulation. Alfaro, Kalemli-
Ozcan, and Volosovych (2014) find a similar correlation between reserve accumulation and
growth, and further show that private capital inflows such as portfolio investment and FDI
are in contrast positively correlated with productivity growth. Aizenman and Lee (2010)
and Korinek and Servén (2016) develop models with a learning-by-doing externality in the
tradable sector and study the optimal reserve policy. Attracting FDI is another proposed
channel through which reserve accumulation promotes productivity growth. Dooley et al.
(2007, 2014) argue that Asian countries’growth strategy is to repress the real wage by foreign
exchange rate intervention in order to attract FDI from developed countries. Consistent with
this view, Aizenman and Lee (2010) find that FDI inflows from Japan and Korea to China
have increased along with China’s reserve holdings since 2000.
Another strand of literature studies the precautionary benefits of reserve accumulation.
Jeanne and Rancière (2011) model reserve accumulation as an insurance contract that pays
off in a sudden stop, and quantify the optimal amount of reserve holdings. Bianchi, Hatch-
ondo, and Martinez (2016) build a sovereign default model in which the government holds
reserve assets to insure against future defaults and loss of access to international financial
markets.
All of these theoretical papers focus on either the growth-promoting effect or the pre-
cautionary effect of reserve accumulation, but not both. The model in this chapter in-
corporates both effects into a unified framework and studies the interaction between the
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growth-promoting effect and the precautionary effect. In this sense, reserve policy in this
chapter is similar to that in Benigno and Fornaro (2012). The key difference between my
model and theirs is the growth process and how reserve policy promotes growth. Benigno
and Fornaro (2012) assume that productivity in the tradable sector increases as more im-
ported inputs are used for production, which is the externality in their model. Reserve policy
promotes growth and improves welfare by inducing private agents to use more imported in-
puts. In my model, on the other hand, productivity in the tradable sector improves through
endogenous domestic and FDI entry and incumbent firms’innovation. Entry and innovation
are forward-looking decisions, and reserve policy induces more innovations and attracts FDI
by increasing expected future profits for domestic and foreign firms. In particular, bailouts
during sudden stops prevent sharp drops in firms’profits, and thus anticipation of future
bailouts induces more innovations and attracts FDI, while in Benigno and Fornaro (2012)
interventions during sudden stops help private agents to import more inputs and promote
growth. In addition, reserve accumulation in my model crowds out domestic investment
through a higher foreign borrowing spread, while in Benigno and Fornaro (2012) there is no
crowding out by reserve accumulation.
There are a few papers that study cross-country differences in the amount or the pace of
reserve accumulation. Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010) consider the risk of double
drain of capital and measure the optimal amount of reserve holdings relative to the size of
the banking system. They show that even China does not appear to be an extreme outlier.
Aguiar and Amador (2011) develop a neo-classical growth model with political frictions and
show that differences in the degree of these frictions can explain cross-country differences in
the speed of net public debt reduction. This chapter focuses instead on two other factors that
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can explain cross-country variation in the pace of reserve accumulation, the debt-elasticity
of the spread on foreign borrowing and the FDI entry cost.
The model structure of this chapter rests on two strands of literature. First, the endoge-
nous growth framework is based on a version of the Schumpeterian growth model developed
by Ates and Saffi e (2016). They incorporate the growth model developed by Klette and
Kortum (2004) into a DSGE framework, and also introduce heterogeneous innovations. I
extend Ates and Saffi e (2016) by introducing FDI and innovation by foreign firms. Second,
sudden stops are modeled as an occasionally binding constraint on foreign borrowing. The
borrowing constraint in this model is similar to Bianchi (2016), and different from Mendoza
(2010) in that the fraction of capital used as collateral is stochastic, and the collateral value
of capital is set at book value rather than market value.
Lastly, this chapter shares with several recent papers the feature that crises have a perma-
nent negative impact on productivity. Queralto (2015) builds a model based on the Comin
and Gertler (2006) version of the product-variety expansion model and shows that the model
can explain the permanent negative effect of the 1998 sudden stop on productivity in Korea.
Gornemann (2015) also adopts the product-variety expansion model and develops a model
that captures a very persistent negative effect of sovereign default on productivity. Ates and
Saffi e (2016) introduce heterogeneous innovations and financial selection into the Schum-




The model framework is based on a standard infinite-horizon small open economy with
tradable and non-tradable sectors. The overview of the model environment is as follows.
The tradable goods producers use capital, a variety of differentiated intermediate goods, and
imported inputs for production. Capital and differentiated intermediate goods are the two
drivers of economic growth. The economy starts with scarce capital and grows quickly by
accumulating capital. A variety of intermediate goods are produced by domestic and foreign
firms. They are modeled as a version of the Schumpeterian growth model developed by
Klette and Kortum (2004) and Ates and Saffi e (2016), in which new entry and incumbent
firms’innovations increase aggregate productivity endogenously. I extend their framework to
incorporate FDI entry and foreign firms’innovations. The country is also subject to a sudden
stop in the form of an occasionally binding borrowing constraint on foreign debt and working
capital financing. In particular, the borrowing limit is set as a fraction of capital holdings
of the country, and the fraction occasionally tightens with an exogenous probability. Unlike
business cycle models such as Mendoza (2010), the possibility of sudden stops exists only
in the transition periods of capital accumulation. In the transition where capital is scarce,
there is a large need for foreign borrowing to accumulate capital, but the borrowing limit is
tight. In this case, a negative shock to the borrowing limit causes a binding constraint and
generates drops in output, consumption, investment, and FDI inflows. In the long run when
capital has reached a steady state condition, the borrowing limit is large enough that the
borrowing constraint never binds, and the economy follows a smooth balanced growth path.
The focus of the analysis in this chapter is therefore how reserve policy should be conducted
10
Figure 1.2: Model Economy
during the transition period of capital accumulation.
Figure 1.2 presents a diagram for the model economy. There are six agents in the model.
First, tradable goods producers produce goods by using capital, a variety of intermediate
goods, and imported inputs. They also borrow from abroad using non-contingent one-period
debt and within-period working capital financing. Because households in this model do not
have direct access to the international financial market, tradable goods producers borrow
from abroad to smooth consumption and accumulate capital on behalf of households.4 Bor-
rowing from abroad is subject to the stochastic borrowing limit as explained above. Second,
intermediate goods producing firms produce a unit mass of differentiated intermediate goods
using labor and sell output to tradable goods producers. There are domestic and foreign
4Even if households directly borrow from abroad, it would be an equivalent model. The assumption here
is just to simplify the model by avoiding two agents facing the same borrowing constraint.
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intermediate firms, and each firm produces one or more product line(s) of differentiated
goods. There is endogenous entry and innovations by domestic firms and foreign firms, and
through these activities aggregate productivity of intermediate goods increases over time.
The detailed exposition of the firm dynamics and the growth process will be laid out below.
Third, there are an infinite number of foreign firms who consider acquiring product lines
from domestic firms and entering this country using FDI. Fourth, non-tradable goods pro-
ducers produce goods using labor and sell output to households. Fifth, households consume
tradable and non-tradable goods, accumulate and rent capital, and supply labor. They also
invest in innovation to create new intermediate goods producing firms.
Given this model environment, the government engages in reserve policy to improve
household’s welfare. As explained above, reserve policy consists of two interventions. In
normal times when the borrowing constraint is not binding, the government collects lump-
sum taxes from tradable goods producers and accumulates reserves. When the borrowing
constraint binds, the government provides accumulated reserves to tradable goods producers
to help finance the working capital payment and prevent an economic downturn. I call this
intervention a bailout by the government. I next turn to the characterization of each agent.
1.3.1 Tradable Goods Producer
Tradable goods are the numeraire of this model economy, and their price is normalized
at one. The representative tradable goods producer uses capital KDt , unit-mass variety of
intermediate goods {yt(i)}1i=0, and imported inputs Mt to produce output Y Tt following the
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Cobb-Douglas production function:













Before production materializes, a fixed fraction φ of the cost of intermediate goods and
imported inputs needs to be paid. This payment is financed by within-period borrowing from
abroad with no interest cost. In addition, the tradable goods producer borrows from abroad
using one-period non-contingent debt Bt. Foreign borrowing is subject to an occasionally
binding borrowing constraint. Specifically, the borrowing limit is given by κtKt−1, where κt
is a collateral shock and takes either of two values, κH or κL, following a two-state Markov
process; and Kt−1 is the capital stock of this country at the beginning of period t. κH is
the value in normal times, and it is large enough that the borrowing constraint never binds.
With exogenous probability PHL, κt switches from κH to κL, which is small enough that the
borrowing constraint may bind, depending on the state of the economy. In particular, when
capital is scarce, the borrowing limit is low and at the same time there is a large incentive
to borrow from abroad to accumulate capital. In this case, a collateral shock κL is likely
to cause a binding borrowing constraint. As seen later, the binding borrowing constraint
endogenously generates drops in output, consumption, investment in capital and innovation,
and FDI inflows. When this happens, the government provides Vt units of reserves to help
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finance working capital payments and mitigate the negative impacts from a sudden stop. A
negative collateral shock κL ends with probability PLH , in which case κt switches back to
the normal value κH .
Given these settings, the maximization problem of the representative tradable goods











subject to the production function (1.1) and
ΠTt = Y
T
t − rtKDt −
∫ 1
0







− Vt ≤ κtKt−1 (1.4)
where λt is the marginal utility of tradable goods consumption by households, pt(i) is the
price of intermediate goods i, PM is the price of imported inputs, and Rt−1 is the gross
interest rate on foreign debt repaid at period t. Tt is a lump-sum tax that the government
collects to accumulate reserves. Each period, the tradable goods producer chooses capital
demand KDt , intermediate goods demand {yt(i)}
1
i=0, imported inputs Mt, and foreign debt
Bt to maximize the expected profit discounted by household’s discount rate adjusted by the
marginal utility λt. Let µt denote the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint (1.4).
The first-order conditions with respect to the choice variables are as follows:




































− Vt − κtKt−1
)
= 0, µt ≥ 0 (1.9)
The first three equations are the demand functions for capital, intermediate goods, and
imported inputs. When the borrowing constraint is slack, µt = 0 and the demand functions
for intermediate goods (1.6) and imported inputs (1.7) are the standard ones equating prices
and marginal products. When the borrowing constraint binds, strictly positive µt appears as
the external financing premium on working capital payments, which increases the effective
cost of inputs. Equation (1.8) is the Euler equation with respect to foreign debt. Given that
λt is the marginal utility of tradable goods consumption by households, it is the standard
Euler equation except when the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint µt appears.
This term captures the external financing premium on foreign debt when the borrowing
constraint binds, which increases the effective real interest rate on foreign debt, as explained
in Mendoza (2010). The last equation (1.9) is the complementary slackness condition for the
borrowing constraint.
The gross interest rate on foreign borrowing Rt is endogenously determined. Following
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), Rt is a function of the aggregate debt-to-GDP ratio:












where GDP is given by Y Tt −PMMt+PNt Y Nt with PNt Y Nt being the non-tradable goods price
times output. As shown in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), this formulation guarantees that
the debt-to-GDP ratio will converge to the given value b and Rt will be R in the long run,
so that the balanced growth path is uniquely pinned down. In this model, however, this
debt-elastic spread plays an important role along the transition path. As the government
collects tax revenue, the tradable goods producer borrows more from abroad to compensate
for loss of resources. This causes a higher interest spread through equation (1.10), which
triggers two key consequences of reserve accumulation. First, because foreign borrowing
becomes more costly, the tradable goods producer does not fully offset the collected tax by
borrowing the same amount. This in turn leads to lower tradable goods consumption by
households and causes real depreciation. This is the mechanism of how reserve accumulation
causes real depreciation in the model. Real depreciation in turn shifts more labor to the
tradable sector and brings higher profits for intermediate firms, which induces innovation
and promotes growth. Second, higher interest rate implies a higher cost for investment, and
thus crowds out investment both in capital and innovation. Section 4.2 discusses these key
mechanisms and their implications for the optimal policy in more detail.
1.3.2 Intermediate Goods Producing Firms
There is a unit-mass variety of differentiated intermediate goods in the tradable sector,
indexed by i. Following the versions of the Schumpeterian growth model developed by
Klette and Kortum (2004) and Ates and Saffi e (2016), a firm is defined as a collection of
one or more product line(s) among these differentiated goods.5 Each firm produces the
5The number of firms is endogenously determined by entry and innovation, as in Klette and Kortum
(2004) and Ates and Saffi e (2016). Although the model structure allows me to study the firm age and size
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product line(s) it owns using labor, and innovates over other product lines. The production
technology is given by:
yt(i) = at(i)`t(i) (1.11)
where at(i) is the labor productivity and `t(i) is labor input. Labor productivity at(i) is
heterogeneous across i, and improves over time by entry and innovations by domestic and
foreign firms. The entry and innovation processes will be laid out in the next section. I first
show that only the productivity leader produces goods for each product line, and explain
how profit is determined by the size of the productivity lead over rival firms. As shown
in equation (1.6), demand for each product line from the tradable goods producer is unit-
elastic. This implies that the solution to the profit-maximization problem for a monopolist is
to set the price infinitely high. In the Schumpeterian growth model, however, there are rival
firms that can produce the same type of good with lower productivity, who could steal the
market by setting a price slightly below the monopoly price. Therefore, through Bertrand
competition, the profit-maximizing behavior by the productivity leader is to set the price
equal to the marginal cost of the closest rival firm and monopolize the demand.
Next I explain how the productivity lead over the closest rival firm is determined. There
are three different cases for a productivity increase. First, when domestic innovation happens
on a product line, either by new entry or an incumbent’s innovation, it improves productivity
of the product line by a factor of (1 + σDt ). This implies that the productivity leader of
a domestic-owned product line has (1 + σDt ) times higher productivity than that of the
previous leader, which is the closest rival. Second, when a domestic-owned product line is
distribution, I focus on how reserve policy affects FDI and aggregate growth, and do not conduct firm-level
analysis in this chapter.
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acquired by foreign investors, which I call FDI entry, productivity increases by a factor of
(1+σFt )/(1+σ
D




t . Since the productivity leader of a domestic-owned product
line has (1 + σDt ) times higher productivity than the closest rival, a productivity increase by
a factor of (1 + σFt )/(1 + σ
D
t ) upon FDI entry means that a product line acquired by foreign
investors has (1+σFt ) times higher productivity than the closest rival. Third, when a foreign
incumbent firm innovates on a product line, productivity increases by a factor of (1 + σFt ).
The productivity improvement process can be summarized as follows:
at(i) =

(1 + σDt )at−1(i) if domestic entry or innovation
(1 + σFt )/(1 + σ
D
t )at−1(i) if FDI entry
(1 + σFt )at−1(i) if foreign innovation
at−1(i) none of the above
Under this process, the productivity lead over the closest rival is simply determined by
whether the productivity leader is a domestic firm or a foreign firm. In the former case the
productivity lead is by a factor of (1+σDt ), and in the latter case it is by a factor of (1+σ
F
t ).
I assume that the productivity step sizes σDt and σ
F
t are increasing in capital scarcity, de-
fined as kss/kt−1, where kss = Kt−1/At is the capital stock Kt−1 normalized by the aggregate
productivity At along the balanced growth path, and kt−1 = Kt−1/At is the same variable in

















with ρ > 0 and σF > σD. In the transition in which capital is scarce, kss/kt−1 > 1 and
the step sizes are large. As capital accumulates and kt−1 gets close to kss, kss/kt−1 declines
toward 1 and the step sizes converge to σD and σF along the balanced growth path. The
idea behind this assumption is that capital scarcity indicates the technological distance from
the world frontier, and when there is a large distance, the economy can grow faster through
the catching-up effect.
Now I show how profit for each intermediate firm is determined. As explained above,
demand from the tradable goods producer (1.6) is unit-elastic, and thus the profit-maximizing
behavior by the productivity leader is to set the price equal to the marginal cost of the closest
rival. Given the productivity leader’s productivity at(i) for a product line i at period t,
productivity of the closest rival is given by at(i)/(1 + σst), where s = D,F indicates whether
the productivity leader is a domestic firm or a foreign firm. The optimal price pt(i) and
















where Wt is the real wage. The middle term of equation (1.15) implies that from the
individual firm’s viewpoint, larger demand from the tradable goods producer and a cheaper
real wage bring higher profits. Using the expression in (1.14), the profit can be written as
the last term of equation (1.15). This expression shows that the profit for each product line
depends only on the owner type s = D,F , and is independent of the product-line specific
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productivity at(i). It follows from the middle term of (1.15) that the labor input also depends
only on the owner type. Hereafter I use πDt and π
F
t to denote the profits for a domestic-owned
and a foreign-owned product line respectively, and `Dt and `
F
t to denote the corresponding





There are two more things to note from equation (1.15). First, the assumption σF > σD
implies πFt > π
D
t , i.e. foreign-owned product lines yield higher profits than domestic-owned
product lines. Second, profits are affected by the borrowing constraint on the tradable goods
producer through the Lagrange multiplier µt. When the borrowing constraint binds, the
tradable goods producer faces a higher effective cost of buying intermediate goods, which thus
reduces their demand. Equation (1.15) shows that the smaller demand directly translates
into a lower profit for the intermediate goods producing firms.
1.3.3 Innovation and Firm Dynamics
In the previous subsection I showed that only the productivity leader produces each product
line and that its profit depends only on the owner type. I now turn to firm dynamics with
a focus on how productivity leaders change through innovation. The firm dynamics in this
economy are characterized by four different types of innovations: domestic entry, FDI entry,
domestic incumbent innovation, and foreign incumbent innovation. Figure 1.3 illustrates an
example of the evolution of firms from one period to the next. The left panel shows 6 product
lines with productivity a1 to a6. The first three lines are owned and produced by domestic
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firm 1, and the other three lines by foreign firm 1. In the next period, depicted in the right
panel, foreign investors acquire product line 1 from domestic firm 1 via FDI entry. FDI entry
improves productivity of product line 1 by the factor of (1 + σFt )/(1 + σ
D
t ). For product line
3, foreign incumbent firm 1 succeeds in innovation and improves its productivity by the
factor of (1 + σFt ). Thus domestic firm 1 loses two product lines and shrinks its business.
For product line 6, there is domestic entry and a new domestic firm obtains the product
line from foreign firm 1. Through entry and innovation, firms compete with each other and
endogenously enter, exit, expand and shrink, and increase the overall productivity of the
country.
This framework captures several features of FDI entry and foreign firms documented by
empirical studies: (1) Most FDI entry is through the acquisition of domestic firms rather
than greenfield investment.6 (2) Some domestic firms are forced to exit through competition
with foreign firms.7 In later sections I will also show: (3) Foreign firms innovate more often
than domestic firms.8 (4) In a crisis, foreign firms invest more in innovation than domestic
firms and are more likely to survive.9 I now move on to the characterization of entry and
innovation. I start from innovation by foreign incumbent firms.
Innovation by Foreign Incumbent Firms Let θt−1 denote the fraction of product lines
owned by foreign firms at the beginning of period t. Consider a foreign firm that owns
n product lines. As seen before, operating profit depends only on the owner type and is
independent of the individual firms’s productivity. Therefore the total operating profit of
6Navaretti and Venables (2004) shows that 90% of FDI is in the form of acquisitions.
7See Aitken and Harrison (1999).
8See Arnold and Javorcik (2009) and Guadalupe et al. (2012).
9See Alfaro et al. (2012).
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Figure 1.3: Firm Dynamics
this firm is nπFt . I assume that a firm with n product lines has n opportunities to innovate.
The idea behind this assumption is that an incumbent firm’s innovation is based on and
spins off from the existing technology in practice. Following Akcigit and Kerr (2015), the
success probability of innovation iFt for each innovation opportunity is a concave function of








where ηF > 0 is the productivity coeffi cient and 0 < ρF < 1 is the parameter that governs the
concavity. As is common in Schumpeterian growth models, innovation is undirected in the
sense that innovation is equally likely to apply to any product line. This feature is preserved
in this model by the structure that the operating profit is independent of productivity. Undi-
rected innovations by many firms imply that each product line faces the same replacement
probability. Let dt denote this probability, and define as P (i, n, p) the probability of having
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i successes in n trials for a binomial process with success probability p. Namely,






The value of a foreign firm with n product lines can be written in a recursive form as follows:
V Ft (n) = max
ZFt
{










P (j, n, dt)Et
(
V Ft+1(n+ i− j)
))]}
The first two terms are the operating profit minus the innovation investment cost. RF is
the world interest rate, and foreign investors who own foreign firms discount future profits
by this rate. The bracketed term is the expected value of this firm next period. The
first summation adds up the expected value over the n+ 1 cases for the number of successful
innovations, from 0 to n. The second summation adds up over the n+1 cases for the number
of replacements, again from 0 to n. Thus for a foreign firm with n product lines, there are (n+
1)2 different possible combinations of the number of successful innovations and replacements.
Note, however, that the expected value of the firm in each case, Et
(
V Ft+1(n+ i− j)
)
, depends
only on the number of the product lines, n+ i− j, and not on the specific combination of the
number of innovations and replacements. For example, 3 innovations and 2 replacements will
give the same expected value as 4 innovations and 3 replacements, namely Et(V Ft+1(n+ 1)).
Following Ates and Saffi e (2016), I use a guess-and-verify method to show that the value
of a foreign firm with n product lines is equal to n times the value of a foreign firm with a
single product line:




The formal proof is left to the Appendix. This linear relation enables us to aggregate the
firm dynamics in a tractable way and study how the firm dynamics affect the endogenous
growth of the entire economy, without keeping track of the firm size distribution. The value
of a foreign firm with a single product line is given by:
V Ft (1) = max
ZFt
{
πFt − ZFt +
1
RF
(1 + iFt − dt)Et(V Ft+1(1))
}
(1.18)














t+1(1)) = 1 (1.19)
Since I assume 0 < ρF < 1, investment ZFt and the probability of successful innovation i
F
t
are increasing in the expected value of a product line next period.
FDI Entry FDI entry takes the form of an acquisition of a domestic-owned product line
by foreign investors. There are infinitely many foreign investors who can consider acquiring
a product line and entering this country via FDI. There are three types of cost for FDI entry.
First, foreign investors need to pay a fixed fraction 0 < λ < 1 of the discounted expected
value of a product line (1/RF )Et(V Ft+1(1)) to the domestic firm that owns the product line.
λ can be interpreted as the negotiation power of the domestic owner firm against foreign
investors.10 Second, there is a fixed entry cost AtCF . This is in line with Helpman, Melitz,
10For the domestic owner firm to be willing to sell a product line to foreign investors, the incentive com-
patibility condition must be satisfied. This condition is given by λ(1/RF )Et(V Ft+1(1)) ≥ Et(Λt,t+1V Dt+1(1))
where the right-hand side is the expected value of a domestic-owned product line discounted by the house-
holds’stochastic discount factor. Because this condition is always satisfied under the calibrated parameter
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and Yeaple (2004) in that FDI entry is characterized by a large fixed entry cost. Third, there
is a congestion cost of entry, which is linearly increasing in the aggregate number of product
lines acquired by FDI in each period. Since there is an infinite number of potential foreign
investors, FDI entry continues until the congestion cost pushes down the net expected profit













where χF is a coeffi cient on the congestion cost. The denominator 1− θt−1 is the fraction of
domestic-owned product lines at the beginning of period t. This is introduced to capture the
idea that it is more costly to find a good product line to acquire as the number of domestic-
owned product lines falls. Both the congestion cost and the fixed entry cost increase over
time along with the aggregate productivity of the economy At , so that FDI entry eFt will be
constant in the long run. Similarly to innovation by foreign incumbent firms, FDI entry eFt
is an increasing function of the expected value of a product line.
Innovation by Domestic Incumbent Firms Characterization of domestic incumbent
firms is similar to foreign incumbent firms, but different in one key aspect: there is the
possibility that product lines are acquired by foreign investors via FDI. Consider a domestic
firm with n product lines. This firm has n innovation opportunities as assumed for foreign
firms. For each opportunity, the firm invests ZDt units of tradable goods, and the probability
values, I do not consider it explicitly.
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with 0 < ρD < 1. Let Qt denote the price that foreign investors pay to the domestic owner







UsingQt, the replacement probability dt, and the probability for a binomial process P (i, n, p),
the value of a domestic firm with n product lines can be recursively written as follows:













































Compared to the value of a foreign firm, the additional terms are the third summation in
the second line and the third line. The third summation in the second line adds up the
expected value over the n− j + 1 cases for the number of product lines acquired via FDI by
foreign investors, from 0 to n−j, given that j product lines are replaced. eFt /(1−θt−1) is the
probability that each product line is acquired via FDI by foreign investors. Note that the
expected value of the firm next period is discounted by the households’stochastic discount
factor Λt,t+1. Note also that the number of product lines the firm owns next period is given
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by n + i − j − k. The third line adds up the acquisition price of FDI entry over the same
n − j + 1 cases given j replacements. Using the same guess-and-verify method, it can be
shown that a linear relation holds for the value of a domestic firm:
V Dt (n) = nV
D
t (1)
and the value of a domestic firm with a single product line is given by:
V Dt (1) = max
ZDt
{
πDt − ZDt +
[



























t+1(1)) = 1 (1.24)
Domestic Entry Finally, entry of new domestic firms comes from innovation by house-
holds and poaches a product line from incumbent firms. Households invest ZEt units of
tradable goods to create new firms. The number of firms created from ZEt units of invest-




















t+1(1)) = 1 (1.26)
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1.3.4 Aggregation and Productivity Growth
I now characterize how firm dynamics translate into macroeconomic dynamics, specifically
the transition of the share of product lines owned by foreign firms, and productivity growth.
First, replacement of a product line happens through three different channels: domes-
tic incumbent innovations, foreign incumbent innovations, and domestic entry. Thus the
replacement rate dt is the sum of these three probabilities:
dt = (1− θt−1)iDt + θt−1iFt + eDt (1.27)
Note that the successful innovation probabilities by incumbents, iDt and i
F
t , are multiplied
by the share of domestic-owned and foreign-owned product lines respectively. Next I derive
the transition equation of θt, the share of product lines owned by foreign firms. θt increases
for two reasons: foreign incumbent innovation over domestic-owned product lines, and FDI
entry. θt decreases for two reasons: domestic incumbent innovation and domestic entry over
foreign-owned product lines. The transition of θt is thus given by the following law of motion:
θt = θt−1 + θt−1(1− θt−1)iFt + eFt − θt−1(1− θt−1)iDt − θt−1eDt
= θt−1 + e
F
t − θt−1eDt + (iFt − iDt )θt−1(1− θt−1) (1.28)
Next I derive the expressions for aggregate productivity and its growth. I first combine
(1.15) and (1.16) to obtain the ratio between labor input by domestic-owned product lines
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Combining this with total labor in the tradable sector LTt = (1− θt−1)`Dt + θt−1`Ft , I obtain
the following expressions for labor input by domestic-owned and foreign-owned product lines:
`Dt =
1 + σF




(1− θt−1)σF + θt−1σD
LTt
Plugging these equations and the production function for intermediate goods (1.11) into





θt−1(1 + σF )
1−θt−1
θt−1(1 + σD) + (1− θt−1)(1 + σF )
(1.29)






and LTt is total labor hired by intermediate goods producing firms. As is clear from the
expression, aggregate productivity At grows as productivity of each product line at(i) im-
proves. Using the four different innovation rates and the innovation sizes, the growth rate
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of At is characterized as follows:
At+1
At






eDt (1 + σD)
(1−θt−1)iDt (1 + σF )
θt−1iFt (1.30)
The four terms in the right-hand side correspond respectively to FDI entry, domestic en-
try, domestic incumbent innovation, and foreign incumbent innovation. This completes the
characterization of firm dynamics and its effect on aggregate productivity growth.
1.3.5 Non-Tradable Goods Producer
The non-tradable goods producer hires labor from households and produces non-tradable
goods. The production function is given as follows:




where 0 < 1 − αN < 1 is the labor share in non-tradable goods production. I assume that
total factor productivity in non-tradable goods production increases at the same rate as
aggregate productivity in the tradable sector. This assumption comes from the empirical
fact that productivity spillovers from multinational firms to domestic firms happen through
worker mobility.11 Since this spillover to non-tradable goods production is not internalized
by those making innovation investment decisions, it works as an externality that may cause
too little innovation. In the appendix, I study a version of the model with slow productivity
spillovers to the non-tradable sector, and find that this alteration does not affect the optimal
reserve policy or its welfare impact substantially. This spillover guarantees that production
11Dasgupta (2012) reviews the relevant empirical literature.
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of tradable goods and non-tradable goods will grow at the same rate in the long run. Let
PNt denote the non-tradable goods price. Since the law of one price holds for tradable goods
between this country and the rest of the world, the non-tradable goods price PNt determines
the real exchange rate of this country. Thus I call PNt the real exchange rate, and an increase




t At(1− αN)(LNt )−α
N
(1.32)
Since labor is mobile between the tradable and non-tradable sectors, the real wage Wt is







which is paid to households.
1.3.6 Household
The representative household consumes tradable goods CTt and non-tradable goods C
N
t ,
supplies labor Lt elastically, accumulates and rents capitalKt to the tradable goods producer,
and invests ZEt units of tradable goods in domestic entry. They receive the wage income
WtLt, capital income rtKt−1, and profits from tradable goods producers ΠTt , non-tradable
goods producers ΠNt , and domestic intermediate goods producing firms (1− θt−1)(πDt −ZDt ).
They also receive FDI inflow eFt Q
F
t , which is revenue from the sales of domestic-owned
product lines to foreign investors. The representative household’s optimization problem is
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t + (1− θt−1)(πDt − ZDt ) + eFt QFt (1.35)







− (1 + g)
)2
(1.36)
where γ is a parameter to determine the weight of tradable goods in composite consumption
Ct, ε is the constant elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable consump-
tion, and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. Capital accumulation is subject to a capital
adjustment cost that slows down the transition process, and ψk is the parameter the gov-
erns the size of this cost. The functional form of the capital adjustment cost is taken from
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) to be consistent with long-run growth of the economy.
Optimal investment in domestic entry ZEt is determined by equation (1.25). The first-




















































The stochastic discount factor Λt,t+1 is then given by Λt,t+1 = βλt+1/λt. Equation (1.37)
relates the optimal ratio of tradable and non-tradable goods consumption to the real exchange
rate. Equation (1.38) gives the optimal labor supply Lt, and equation (1.39) is the Euler
equation with respect to capital.
1.3.7 Government
The government in this model engages in reserve policy to improve household’s welfare. The
reserve policy consists of two types of interventions. First, when κt = κH and the borrowing
constraint is loose, the government collects Tt units of tradable goods through a lump-sum
tax and accumulates reserves. In general Tt can be any function of the state of the economy,
but in this chapter I consider a simple tax rule that the government collects a fraction τ of
tradable goods output Y Tt each period. Second, when κt = κL and the borrowing constraint
binds, the government provides accumulated reserves to the tradable goods producer to help
finance working capital payments, which I call a bailout.
The government keeps accumulating τY Tt units of reserves each period until it becomes
suboptimal to do so. There are two reasons why accumulating reserves becomes suboptimal
at some point in the transition. First, the benefit from attracting FDI becomes smaller as
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capital accumulates and the step size σFt (kt) becomes smaller. Second, as capital accumu-
lates, the collateral value becomes large enough at some point that the borrowing constraint
never binds and there is no need for bailouts. For these reasons it is optimal for the govern-
ment to stop accumulating reserves once capital is suffi ciently accumulated.12
Bailouts in sudden stops are modeled as follows. The borrowing constraint being binding
implies that the tradable goods producer cannot borrow as much as they would if the bor-
rowing constraint was loose. Let Y T,looset denote tradable goods output when the constraint
is loose. The shortage of foreign borrowing, denoted by St, can be written as follows:
St = max
{
−Bt + φ (1− α)Y T,looset − κLKt−1, 0
}
The first two terms are the borrowing amount when the constraint is loose, and κLKt−1 is
the borrowing limit, so that the gap is the shortage of foreign borrowing. A negative gap
implies that the tight borrowing limit κLKt−1 is still large enough to cover the necessary
amount of borrowing, and in this case a max operator sets St = 0. When St is positive, the
borrowing constraint binds without a bailout, and the government transfers reserves to the
tradable goods producer to cover the shortage up to the amount of reserves at hand. The






12It is also optimal for the government not to rebate reserves after reserve accumulation stops, because
rebating reserves would reduce the growth rate in the model. The redundant reserves are lost from the
economy, but the welfare loss is limited (smaller than 0.02% of permanent consumption) because the value
of goods received after 40 periods or more in the future is heavily discounted.
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where RFFt−1 is the amount of reserves at the beginning of period t.
Note that the size of a bailout is dependent on the amount of private debt, and thus the
anticipation of bailouts induces private agents to borrow more. I investigate if this is the
optimal bailout policy by trying two different types of bailout policies. First, I study a bailout
policy in which the government lends reserves to help finance working capital payments, and
tradable producers repay these loans after production. I found that this type of intervention
has a similar effect on productivity growth, but the welfare gain is limited compared to the
benchmark policy described here. Second, in the appendix I also study a bailout policy in
which there is a ceiling on the size of bailouts so that the bailout size is independent of private
debt, and I found the benchmark bailout policy described here achieves higher welfare.
Given the tax rule in normal times and bailouts in sudden stops, the amount of reserves
Ft follows the transition equation given as follows:
Ft =

RFFt−1 + Tt when κt = κH
RFFt−1 − Vt when κt = κL
(1.41)
1.3.8 Market Clearing Conditions
To close the model, this subsection lists the market clearing conditions. The capital market,










Y Nt = C
N
t (1.44)
and labor in the tradable sector satisfies:
LTt = (1− θt−1)`Dt + θt−1`Ft (1.45)
This completes the exposition of the model economy. The appendix formally defines the
equilibrium of the model economy and the stationarized equilibrium conditions that I use to
solve the model numerically.
1.4 Discussion of Reserve Policy
This section elaborates on the key mechanism of the model, namely how the reserve policy
attracts FDI, promotes growth, and improves welfare. The section starts by describing the
main externality in the model and explains how the reserve policy corrects it. The section
then discusses the cost of the reserve policy, and explains the key trade-off that the reserve
policy faces, i.e. lower consumption in the short run and higher consumption in the long
run.
1.4.1 Benefit of Reserve Policy
The key externality in the model is that private agents do not internalize that their actions
affect FDI entry decisions by foreign investors. The main benefit of receiving FDI is that
foreign firms innovate more often than domestic firms, and thus contribute to higher produc-
tivity growth. To attract more FDI, households should invest more in capital and innovation
to increase the growth rate of the economy, and make more labor available for foreign firms.
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Higher growth and more labor will bring higher profits for foreign firms and attract more
FDI entry.
The reserve policy is intended to correct this externality through two channels. The first
one is the real depreciation channel. In normal times when the borrowing constraint is loose,
the government collects taxes from private agents to accumulate reserves. As some resources
are taken away by the government and profit for the tradable producer falls, households
reduce tradable goods consumption. One thing to note here is that private agents have
an incentive to offset reserve accumulation by borrowing more from abroad. There are two
reasons why they have an incentive to borrowmore from abroad. First, they have an incentive
to compensate for the loss of resources. Second, anticipation of future bailouts induces them
to borrow more. As shown in Jeanne (2012), if reserve accumulation is completely offset
by private foreign borrowing, it would have no effect on the consumption path, and thus
it would not cause real depreciation. The key factor that prevents full offset in this model
is the debt-elastic foreign spread. As private agents borrow more from abroad, the interest
spread rises through equation (1.10) and makes foreign borrowing more costly. Therefore
offset is only partial, and households reduce tradable goods consumption.
Next I provide a partial equilibrium intuition for how this reduction in tradable goods
consumption leads to real depreciation and a labor shift to the tradable sector. First, I
combine equations (1.1), (1.7), (1.15), (1.29) and (1.32) to obtain the wage equality condition
across sectors:








where F (Kt−1, θt−1) is a function of the state variables. Since production is concave in labor
in both the tradable sector and the non-tradable sector, the marginal product of labor is
decreasing in labor in both sectors. Solving the second equation for PNt and plugging it
into the optimality condition between tradable and non-tradable goods consumption (1.37),
along with non-tradable goods production (1.31), we have:
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Note that labor in the tradable sector LTt is the only endogenous variable in this equation
except CTt and total labor supply Lt, given the state variables. Therefore, this equation indi-
cates that the reduction in tradable goods consumption CTt caused by reserve accumulation
requires a labor shift across sectors. Specifically, a labor shift to the tradable sector, i.e.
higher LTt , decreases the right-hand side by decreasing the marginal product of labor in the
tradable sector (numerator) and increasing the marginal product of labor in the non-tradable
sector (denominator), and recovers the equality. This labor shift also reduces non-tradable
goods production in the denominator of the left-hand side, but since the right-hand side
is lower, the reduction in non-tradable goods production is smaller than the reduction in
tradable goods consumption.13 Note also that the fraction inside the parenthesis in the
right-hand side is the real exchange rate PNt . Therefore, reserve accumulation causes real
depreciation and a labor shift to the tradable sector. In addition, it is clear from equation
(1.46) that this labor shift also reduces the real wageWt. This mechanism is in line with the
13It can be easily seen that an opposite labor shift, i.e. lower LTt , is not consistent with a reduction in C
T
t .
Lower LTt would increase the right-hand side, and at the same time decrease the left-hand side even more
by increasing non-tradable goods production.
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empirical findings by Rodrik (2008) that real depreciation promotes productivity growth by
shifting more production resources to the tradable sector.
To see the effect of this labor shift on FDI entry and innovation, I derive the expression
for tradable output Y Tt in terms of labor by combining (1.1), (1.7) and (1.29):





where G(Kt−1, θt−1) is another function of the state variables. Thus tradable output is an
increasing function of labor in the tradable sector. Now recall the expression for firms’profit







It follows that a labor shift to the tradable sector increases profits for intermediate firms.
From the viewpoint of individual firms, they enjoy higher profits due to larger demand and
a cheaper real wage.
The second channel through which the reserve policy attracts FDI and corrects the ex-
ternality is the precautionary channel. When the borrowing constraint binds, bailouts help
the tradable goods producer finance working capital payments, and prevent sharp drops
in profits for intermediate firms. Since FDI entry and innovation investment decisions are
forward-looking, anticipation of future bailouts increases the expected value of firms and
induces more FDI entry and innovation today.
In summary, the reserve policy consists of reserve accumulation in normal times and
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bailouts in sudden stops. Anticipation of these policy interventions in the future increases the
expected profits for intermediate firms today, and attracts more FDI entry and induces more
innovation today. There is also a feedback loop that growth induces further growth. Harrison
and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) review the empirical literature on FDI entry and summarize the
extensive evidence that FDI is attracted to less risky and growing markets. The main
mechanism here is consistent with this empirical fact, and in this model the reserve policy
achieves high and stable growth. However, whether the reserve policy can improve welfare
depends on its cost. The next section discusses this point.
1.4.2 Cost of Reserve Policy
There are two types of costs associated with the reserve policy in the model. First, as
explained above, private agents do not fully offset reserve accumulation by foreign borrowing,
so that consumption of tradable goods becomes lower in the short run. Consumption of non-
tradable goods also becomes lower because reserve accumulation shifts labor to the tradable
sector. As is clear from the discussion in the previous subsection, lower consumption and
a labor shift to the tradable sector are the essential parts of the mechanism of how reserve
policy works. In this sense they are the unavoidable cost of the reserve policy. At the
cost of short-run lower consumption, the reserve policy promotes productivity growth and
households enjoy higher consumption in the long run. Therefore, for the reserve policy to
improve welfare, the long-run gain of higher consumption must exceed the short-run loss of
lower consumption. This is the key trade-off that the reserve policy faces.
The second cost is a crowding-out effect of reserve accumulation. Reinhart, Reinhart,
and Tashiro (2016) show that there is a strong negative correlation between the reserve-to-
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GDP ratio and the investment-to-GDP ratio in Asian countries after 2000, suggesting that
active reserve accumulation crowds out investment. Cook and Yetman (2012) use micro-
level data to empirically show that reserve accumulation reduces bank lending in emerging
Asian countries. In my model the crowding-out effect results from the debt-elastic spread
on foreign borrowing. As the government accumulates reserves by collecting taxes, private
agents borrow more from abroad to compensate for the loss of resources, at least partially.
Higher borrowing then increases the interest rate on foreign debt through equation (1.10). To
see how the higher interest rate on foreign debt crowds out investment in capital, recall that
profits for the tradable producers are evaluated in terms of the marginal utility of tradable
consumption by households λt. The Euler equation with respect to foreign debt therefore
takes the standard form except the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint µt:
λt − µt = βRtEt(λt+1)
Comparing this equation with the Euler equation with respect to capital investment (1.39),
it can be seen that a higher interest rate on foreign debt requires a higher capital return, and
thus crowds out capital investment. A higher interest rate on foreign debt also crowds out
investment in domestic firm entry and innovation. To see this, I arrange the Euler equation













This equation indicates that a higher interest rate on foreign debt reduces the stochastic
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discount factor, implying that households value future tradable consumption less compared
to tradable consumption today. Since investment in domestic firm entry and innovation are
forward-looking, the lower stochastic discount factor leads to lower investment in domestic
entry and innovation.
As seen from equation (1.10), the parameter ψb is crucial for the size of the crowding-out
effect. If ψb is large, reserve accumulation is likely to cause severe crowding-out and slow
down growth. In this case, the long-run gain from higher consumption is likely to be limited,
and the welfare impact of reserve policy is smaller or can be even negative.
In summary, the reserve policy brings higher consumption in the long run at the cost
of lower consumption in the short run. The optimal reserve policy is determined to hit the
balance between the marginal gain and the marginal loss. The policy analysis section shows
how the value of ψb and the FDI entry cost affect the optimal reserve policy and its welfare
gain.
1.5 Quantitative Analysis
This section calibrates the model parameters, demonstrates the baseline simulation, and
discusses the model features. I solve the model numerically by two steps: First I divide the
equilibrium conditions by productivity level At to stationarize the equations. In the second
step I solve the stationarized model globally using a version of the policy function iteration
algorithm to deal with the occasionally binding borrowing constraint. The stationarized
equilibrium conditions and the details of the solution procedure are left to the appendix.
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1.5.1 Calibration
One period in the model is meant to be annual. There are 30 parameters to be determined
in the model, except the debt-elasticity of spread ψb which is estimated from the data below.
I use conventional values in the literature if available, and calibrate the other parameters
to target the data for a sample of eight developing countries from 1990-2010.14 Table 1.1
presents 19 externally-determined parameter values. Six parameters regarding preferences
are set to conventional values in the literature. The discount factor β = 0.96 and gross return
on the safe asset RF = 1.02 are standard values for annual models. The weight on tradable
goods in consumption γ = 0.34 is set following Mendoza (2005) and Durdu, Mendoza, and
Terrones (2009). The elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods
in consumption, ε = 0.6, is in the middle of the range discussed in Mendoza (2005). The
coeffi cient on labor disutility ψ = 0.525 is set so that labor supply in the long run is equal to
1. The parameter for the labor supply elasticity ω = 1.455 is set following Mendoza (1991).
Regarding the production parameters, capital’s share in tradable production α = 0.3 and
the capital depreciation rate δ = 0.1 are set to conventional values. The imported input
price PM is set to be 1, and labor’s share in non-tradable production 1 − αN = 0.75 is
taken from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016). The share of intermediate goods θ is set so
that the imported inputs-to-GDP ratio matches the data at 14%. The fraction of the input
cost subject to the working capital requirement φ is determined by the method adopted in
Mendoza (2010), in which the ratio of domestic credit to private firms relative to GDP is
14The countries are Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Thailand, Tunisia, and Vietnam. These
counties are chosen based on the availability of data for the calibration, such as the manufacturing share of
FDI inflows and JP Morgan EMBI Global spread data.
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Table 1.1: Externally-Determined Parameters
Variable Value Source and Target
β Discount factor 0.96 Standard
RF Return on reserve asset 1.02 Standard
γ Tradable share in consumption 0.34 Mendoza (2005)
ε CES between T and NT 0.6 Middle value in literature
ψ Labor disutility 0.525 Unit labor supply
ω Frisch elasticity 1/(ω − 1) 1.455 Mendoza (1991)
α Capital share 0.3 Standard
θ Intermediate input share 0.56 Imported input/GDP 14%
PM Imported input price 1 Normalized value
1− αN Labor share in non-tradable 0.75 Schmitt-Grohe Uribe (2016)
δ Capital depreciation 0.1 Standard
φ Share of input subject to WC 1.18 Private credit/GDP 47.0%
b Long-run debt/GDP -0.36 Data
R Long-run interest rate 1.0635 Consistent with BGP growth
PHL, PLH Probability matrix of κt 0.080, 0.851 Frequency and duration of SS
ρD, ρE, ρF Concavity of innovation investment 0.5 Akcigit and Kerr (2015)
used as a proxy for working capital. This ratio is 47% on average for the sample countries,
and this results in φ = 1.18. This parameter is set to 1 in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and
1.25 in Uribe and Yue (2006). The long-run debt-to-GDP ratio b is set to the average of the
sample countries in recent years at 36%. The long-run interest rate on foreign borrowing R is
set to be consistent with the long-run growth rate satisfying βR = 1 + g, where the long-run
growth rate g is determined below. The only uncertainty in the model is stochastic borrowing
limit coeffi cient κt. κt follows a two-state Markov process with a 2× 2 transition matrix. I
follow Jeanne and Rancière (2011) and derive the average frequency and duration of sudden
stop episodes in the following way: a given country in a given year is in a sudden stop if the
capital inflow-to-GDP ratio drops more than 5% from the previous year. Using the same
sample of 33 countries as in Jeanne and Rancière (2011) over the period of 1980-2009, the
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unconditional probability of sudden stops is 8.6%, and each sudden stop episode continues
for two years with probability 14.9%. Accordingly I set PHL = 0.080 and PLH = 0.851.
For the parameters related to innovation and FDI entry, the concavity parameters gov-
erning investment, ρD, ρE,ρF , are set to 0.5 following Akcigit and Kerr (2015) and their
literature review. The remaining eight parameters, ηD, ηE, ηF , χF ,λ,CF , σD, σF , are jointly
determined to match eight moments in the data to those in the model in the long run. Each
of the following moments are tightly related to the above eight parameters in the same order.
(1) The ratio of R&D expenditure in the manufacturing sector to GDP is closely related to
ηD, which governs the scale of domestic innovation. This ratio is in general small in de-
veloping countries and high in developed countries. I set the long-run ratio in the model
to match the average of developed countries in the recent data, which is 2.4%. (2) The
domestic entry rate is closely related to ηE. The data is taken from The World Develop-
ment Indicators. The average of sample countries in 2007 is 8.56%. (3) The innovation rate
of foreign firms relative to domestic firms identifies ηF , which governs foreign incumbents’
innovation. Guadalupe, Kuzmina, and Thomas (2012) document that foreign firms in Spain
conduct product innovations 1.387 times more often than domestic firms. I target this value.
(4) The value added share of foreign firms in the manufacturing sector identifies χF , the
congestion cost of FDI entry. This target is meant to pin down the economic presence of
foreign firms in the tradable sector in the model. Ramstetter (2009) reports this value for
Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, and Ramondo (2009) reports this for Chile. The average
of these four countries is 32.25%, which I set as a target. (5) The ratio of FDI inflows to
the manufacturing sector relative to GDP helps to pin down the cost of acquisition for FDI.
The average FDI inflow-to-GDP ratio of the sample countries over 1990-2009 is 3.8%. Data
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for FDI inflows by sector is available at the International Trade Centre’s website. The data
are available only for five of the eight sample countries. The average of the ratio of FDI
inflows to the manufacturing sector relative to total FDI inflows for these countries in 2012
is 50%, thus I set 1.9% as a target. (6) As there is no data or reliable estimation for the
fixed cost of FDI CF , I follow Fillat and Garetto (2015) and set the fixed entry cost so that
it is 72% of the operational profit of foreign-owned product lines. (7) The long-run growth
rate helps to pin down σD, the productivity gain of domestic innovation. It is set to 2.1%,
which is the average growth rate of developed countries in recent years. (8) The productivity
gain from FDI entry identifies σF . Arnold and Javorcik (2009) and Guadalupe, Kuzmina,
and Thomas (2012) estimate the productivity gain from FDI entry in Indonesia and Spain
using the propensity score matching method to control for firm characteristics and mitigate
the cherry-picking effect of FDI entry choice. These papers show that in the year of entry,
firm productivity increases by 11%. Hence I set (1 + σF )/(1 + σD) = 1.11. When I evaluate
each country’s reserve policy below, I allow the FDI congestion cost χF and the fixed entry
cost CF to vary across countries to match variation in the relevant data moments within the
sample.
Finally, the borrowing limit coeffi cient κL, the capital adjustment cost parameter ψk, and
the exponent on the catch-up term ρ are determined to target the model behavior in the
transition, because these parameters are irrelevant along the balanced growth path. κL and
ψk are set to match the sudden stop dynamics of the model with the data shown in the next
subsection. ρ governs the growth rate of the economy in the transition, and thus is set to
match the average growth rate of the model economy in the first 30 periods with the average
growth rate of the sample countries from 1980 to 2010. The average growth rate in the data
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Table 1.2: Jointly-Determined Parameters
Variable Value Target Model
ηD Domestic innovation coeff. 0.24 Manu. R&D/GDP 2.4% 2.40%
ηE Domestic entry coeff. 0.74 Domestic entry rate 8.56% 8.56%
ηF Foreign innovation coeff. 0.21 Relative innovation rate 1.387 1.387
χF Coeff. of FDI congestion cost 0.15 FDI value-added in manu. 32.25% 32.25%
λ Share of FDI firm value paid 0.93 Manu. FDI inflow/GDP 1.9% 1.86%
CF Fixed entry cost 0.037 Fixed entry cost/profit 72% 72%
σD Domestic innovation size 0.21 Long-run growth rate 2.1% 2.1%
σF Foreign innovation size 0.34 11% productivity gain upon FDI entry
Table 1.3: Parameters Related to Transitional Dynamics
Variable Value Target
κL Borrowing limit coeffi cient 0.89 SS dynamics
ψk Capital adjustment cost 15 Drop in investment in SS
ρ Exponent on catch-up term 0.25 Avg. growth 3% in transition
is about 3%. With ρ = 0.25, along with the initial capital holdings k−1 = 0.5kss, the average
growth rate of the first 30 periods is 2.9%. In determining these parameter values, I do not
target the pace of capital accumulation. According to the Penn World Table, the capital
holdings of the sample countries in 1980 is 28% of that in 2010. In the model, the initial
capital K−1 is about 30% of the capital holdings at period 30, which is close to the data.
1.5.2 Quantitative Performance of the Model
This section documents the quantitative performance of the model and demonstrates the
role of the reserve policy. I start by showing a sample dynamic simulation path to give
an idea of what the transition dynamics and sudden stops look like. Figure 1.4 presents
a sample dynamic path without policy intervention. The debt-elasticity of spread is set at
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ψb = 0.0542 as a benchmark; below, I estimate this parameter using a group of developing
countries. Initial capital is 50% of its long-run level as measured by the productivity-adjusted
value, initial debt is 33% of GDP to match with the data in 1980, and the initial share of
foreign-owned product lines is 0. There is a one-time shock to the borrowing constraint
at period 11. The solid lines are the paths with this shock, and the dashed lines are the
smooth paths without shocks as a reference. Panel 2 shows the debt-to-GDP ratio, which
increases gradually as capital accumulates and the borrowing limit expands. When a sudden
stop happens the ratio jumps up, consistent with the stylized facts of sudden stops. The
real exchange rate in Panel 3 drops sharply in a sudden stop. Panels 4-6 show that GDP,
consumption, and investment all fall in a sudden stop, and investment drops the most, which
is also in line with the empirical regularities of sudden stop events illustrated by Mendoza
(2010). The interest spread in Panel 7 increases over time along with the debt-to-GDP ratio,
and it declines in a sudden stop. This decline in the spread in the sudden stop may look odd,
but the effective interest rate actually increases according to the external financing premium
captured by the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint. Turning to innovation
and FDI entry, Panels 8, 9, 11, and 12 show that FDI entry, foreign innovation, domestic
entry, and domestic innovation all drop in a sudden stop. They also show that the size of the
drop is much larger for domestic innovation compared to foreign innovation. This difference
comes from that the fact that the stochastic discount factor by domestic households drops
due to the binding borrowing constraint, as shown in equation (1.47), and thus domestic
firms reduce their investment substantially, while foreign firms discount future profits by
the fixed rate 1/RF . These different responses by domestic and foreign firms are consistent
with the empirical facts documented by Alfaro and Chen (2012) that domestic firms reduce
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Figure 1.4: Model Simulation without Reserve Policy
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investment to a larger extent than foreign-owned firms in crisis. The last panel shows that a
sudden stop has a permanent level effect on productivity. Cerra and Saxena (2008) provide
empirical evidence that the negative effect of a crisis on productivity is very persistent or
almost permanent. This makes a clear contrast to previous business-cycle models of sudden
stops such as Mendoza (2010). Permanent negative effects on productivity suggest that
the cost of sudden stops may be underestimated in business-cycle models and point to the
importance of the endogenous growth framework, especially when the focus is a normative
analysis of policies trying to fight sudden stops.
To take a closer look at the quantitative performance of the model in capturing sudden
stop episodes, I compare the average dynamics of sudden stop events in the model and in
the data. I simulate the model with the same initial conditions as above 1,000 times, and
compute deviations of the key variables from the smooth paths without sudden stops. Then
I take the average of these deviations from the smooth paths in all sudden stop events. For
the data, I derive deviations of the key variables from their smooth trends using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter, using data for the same 33 developing countries in 1980-2009 that I used to
determine the Markov transition matrix for sudden stops. The data for GDP, consumption,
and investment are taken from the World Development Indicators, and the FDI inflow-to-
GDP ratio is computed using the data from Broner, Didier, Erce, and Schmukler (2013).
Then I take the average of these deviations for all the sudden stop events. Figure 1.5 shows
the results for real GDP, real consumption, investment, and the FDI-to-GDP ratio for the
model and the data. The dotted lines are one standard deviation bands for the model
dynamics. It is clear that the model captures the quantitative dynamics of average sudden
stop episodes in the data quite well.
50
Figure 1.5: Sudden Stop Dynamics, Model and Data
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Next I introduce reserve policy and demonstrate how it affects the transitional dynamics
of the economy. I set a fixed tax rate τ as 3%, which is the optimal policy for this economy
as shown in the next section. The government stops accumulating reserves when capital
holdings adjusted by the productivity level reach 95% of the balanced growth path level as is
true in the optimal policy.15 Figure 1.6 presents the simulation results for the same one-time
shock as above. The solid lines are the paths with the reserve policy and the dashed lines
are the paths without policy. Panel 7,8,9, and 16 show the log gaps from the path without
shocks, with and without policy. As the tax will be zero in the long run, both paths will
converge to the same balanced growth path measured by productivity-adjusted values, but
they are different in productivity levels. Panel 2 shows that reserves are accumulated in
15To be precise, the tax rate is declining linearly from 3% to 0 as kt−1/kss increases from 85% to 95%.
This enables me to avoid an abrupt change in the decision rules and makes numerical solution easier and
more accurate.
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Figure 1.6: Model Simulation with Reserve Policy
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normal times, and provided to private agents when a sudden stop happens. Responding to
reserve accumulation, private agents borrow more to compensate for the collected tax as
shown in Panel 3. As the debt-to-GDP ratio increases, the foreign spread rises as shown in
Panel 6, which makes the offset only partial and reduces tradable consumption. This in turn
causes a real depreciation and a labor shift to the tradable sector as shown in panel 4 and
5. As shown in Panel 7 and 8, GDP and capital investment are always larger with reserve
accumulation, but consumption is lower in the short run because the offset is partial. It
may look puzzling that investment is larger with reserve accumulation, because the higher
interest spread is likely to crowd out investment. The reason is that the increased labor in
the tradable sector and the higher growth rate of productivity under reserve accumulation
increase the marginal product of capital, and this positive effect dominates the negative effect
from the higher spread. When a sudden stop happens, the government gives accumulated
reserves to the private agents, which prevents sharp drops in GDP, investment, consumption,
and real exchange rate. The latter 7 panels are related to firm dynamics and productivity
growth. With reserve accumulation all types of entry and innovation are larger. These
panels also show that intervention in a sudden stop prevents a drop in domestic entry and
innovation, and achieves high and stable growth. The productivity level is higher by 1.7%
after 20 periods, and the gap goes to almost 2.5% in the long run.
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1.6 Optimal Reserve Policy
This section studies how the optimal reserve policy is determined, and shows the first main
result of the chapter: the debt-elasticity of the interest rate spread and the FDI entry cost
are key determinants of the optimal pace of reserve accumulation. As discussed in the
model section, I consider a simple policy rule that the government collects a fixed fraction
τ of tradable output every period to accumulate reserves, and eliminates the tax once the
economy has accumulated enough capital. For the analyses below with different parameters
and tax rates τ , I found that it is optimal to stop collecting taxes when capital holdings
adjusted by the productivity level reach 95% of the balanced growth level. Thus this rule is
fixed for all of the analyses hereafter.16
1.6.1 Role of Debt-Elasticity of Spread
In this subsection I show how the debt-elasticity of the spread ψb affects the optimal re-
serve policy. To have a quantitatively reasonable value for ψb, I estimate it using data for
developing countries. The detailed estimation method is described in the next section, in
which each country’s reserve policy is evaluated quantitatively. The result is that the mean
debt-elasticity of the spread over 22 developing countries is 0.0542, which implies that if the
debt-to-GDP ratio increases by 10%, the spread increases by 54.2 basis points or 0.542%.
I also estimate ψb for five subgroups of countries, according to the number of past defaults
for each country. The estimated values for ψb are 0.0205, 0.0382, 0.0559, 0.0736, and 0.0915
from the fewest defaults to the most defaults. To clarify how different values of ψb affect the
16Again, to be precise, I assume the tax rate is declining linearly from τ to 0 as capital accumulates from
85% to 95%. See footnote 15.
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Figure 1.7: Welfare Impact with Different ψb



























optimal reserve policy, I use 0.0205, 0.0559, and 0.0913 for the following analysis.
The optimal reserve policy is derived in the following way: Given each value for ψb, I
first numerically solve the model without reserve policy, simulate the model with stochastic
shocks for 300 periods 100,000 times, and compute the expected utility. Next I solve the
model with reserve policy τ = 0.01 to 0.06 and compute the expected utility in the same
way. The welfare gain/loss for each reserve policy is evaluated in terms of the permanent
consumption gain/loss in percentage terms, as is common in the literature. The result is
summarized in Figure 1.7. It is clear that the welfare gain from the reserve policy is larger
with a smaller debt-elasticity of spread ψb. It can also be observed that the optimal pace of
reserve accumulation τ is higher with smaller ψb.
To understand the role of ψb, Figure 1.8 plots the dynamics of key variables from simula-
tions with ψb = 0.0205 and ψb = 0.0913. Log gaps refer to logged variables for ψb = 0.0205
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Figure 1.8: Role of ψb
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minus the logged variables for ψb = 0.0913. The tax rate τ is set to 0.04 for both simulations,
and shocks are shut down to see the difference in a clean setting. The first panel shows that
the debt-to-GDP ratio is always smaller with a more elastic spread, implying that private
agents offset reserve accumulation less with a more elastic spread. The smaller offset makes
reserve accumulation more effective at suppressing tradable consumption, so that for the
first several periods the economy grows faster with a more elastic spread. However, as the
debt-to-GDP ratio becomes larger, the interest spread becomes higher with a more elastic
spread, as shown in the second panel. This higher spread discourages capital investment and
slows down capital accumulation as shown in the third and fourth panels. Lower capital in
the tradable sector leads to smaller profits for intermediate goods producing firms, which
thus discourages domestic and foreign entry, and slows down productivity growth. As a
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result, GDP and the productivity level will eventually be lower with a more elastic spread.
This mechanism has an important implication for the optimal pace of reserve accumu-
lation. As discussed in the previous section, the key trade-off that the reserve policy faces
is lower short-run consumption against higher long-run consumption. The debt-elasticity
of the foreign spread determines the extent of crowding-out due to reserve accumulation,
and thus is the key determinant of the long-run gain from the reserve policy. If the spread
is more elastic to private debt, reserve accumulation causes more severe crowding-out and
reduces the growth-promoting effect of reserve accumulation. In this case, the optimal pace
of reserve accumulation is slower, and the welfare gain is limited.
1.6.2 Role of the FDI Entry Cost
Another key determinant of the optimal reserve policy in the model is the FDI entry cost.
There is a vast literature on the determinants of FDI inflows, and many factors have been
identified as significant determinants, such as the host country’s institutions, relative labor
endowments, and so on.17 FDI entry costs in the model can be interpreted as these implicit
factors that govern the size of FDI inflows to the country.18
To show why the FDI entry cost is important for the reserve policy, I change the FDI
entry cost parameters from the baseline calibration to create an economy with a larger FDI
entry cost. In particular, I target the ratio of manufacturing FDI inflows to GDP to 1.08%
rather than the benchmark 1.9%. I use this lower value in the next section to evaluate
the reserve policy in some countries. This target requires me to increase the coeffi cient
17Blonigen (2005) and Blonigen and Piger (2011) review the literature on the determinants of FDI.
18Alternatively, in the appendix I estimate the FDI entry cost across countries using the index for the cost
to start up new businesses.
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Table 1.4: Parameters with large FDI entry cost
Variable Value Target Model
χF Coeff. of FDI congestion cost 0.32 Manu. FDI inflow/GDP 1.08% 1.08%
CF Fixed entry cost 0.040 Fixed entry cost/profit 72% 72%
σD Domestic innovation size 0.24 Long-run growth rate 2.1% 2.1%
σF Foreign innovation size 0.38 11% productivity gain upon FDI entry
Figure 1.9: Welfare Impact with Different FDI Entry Cost


























Large FDI entry cost
on the FDI entry congestion cost χF . I also adjust the fixed entry cost CF to keep the
fixed entry cost-to-profit ratio at 72%, and adjust the innovation step sizes σD and σF
to have the same long-run growth rate as in the baseline model, keeping the relative size
(1 + σF )/(1 + σD) = 1.11 unchanged. The other parameters are left unchanged. New
parameter values are summarized in Table 1.4.
Given these new parameter values, I compute the welfare impact of reserve policy for
different rates of accumulation τ . Figure 1.9 presents the results, with the results from the
baseline model for comparison. Both models are solved assuming ψb = 0.0542. It is clear that
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the welfare gain is substantially smaller for the case with a larger FDI entry cost. The figure
also shows that the optimal pace of reserve accumulation is slower, and as the pace becomes
faster the welfare impact quickly turns negative. This result suggests that attracting FDI is
an important channel through which the reserve policy improves welfare. If some factors of
the country impede FDI inflow and the reserve policy is not effective in attracting FDI, the
optimal pace of reserve accumulation is slower, and the welfare impact is likely to be limited.
1.6.3 Decomposition of Policy Effect
So far I study the effect of the reserve policy as a whole, but the reserve policy consists
of two types of interventions, reserve accumulation in normal times and bailouts in sudden
stops. This subsection conducts a decomposition analysis of the policy effect. Specifically,
to highlight the effect of bailouts on growth and welfare, I compare two different types of
bailout schemes to the baseline policy. The first alternative scheme is that the government
accumulates reserves but never uses them for bailouts. I call this a "no-bailout" scheme.
The second scheme is that the government provides accumulated reserves to private agents
to help finance working capital payments, but private agents need to repay these reserves to
the government after production. I call this a "lending" scheme. The model parameters are
the same as the baseline model, and the debt-elasticity of the spread is set at its benchmark
value ψb = 0.0542. Borrowing constraint shocks are shut down to highlight the effect of
bailout policies through anticipation without actual bailouts.
Figure 1.10 shows the simulation results for the three different policy schemes: the base-
line scheme, the no-bailout scheme, and the lending scheme. The solid curves show the
productivity gaps relative to the case without policy. The dashed curves are created by
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Figure 1.10: Effect of Different Bailout Schemes on Growth
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fixing the FDI entry rate and foreign innovation rate to their values in the case without
policy. Therefore they show the policy effects on growth through only the domestic entry
and innovation channels, and the gaps between the solid curves and the dashed curves show
the policy effects on growth through the FDI entry and foreign innovation channels.
There are three important observations from this figure. First, note that the no-bailout
scheme promotes growth only through the channel of reserve accumulation causing real
depreciation. Therefore the gap between the impact of the baseline policy and the no-
bailout scheme is the effect of the policy on growth through the anticipation of bailouts.
Comparing the baseline policy and the no-bailout scheme tells us that 72% of the effect
of the reserve policy on growth comes from the real depreciation channel, and 28% comes
from the bailout anticipation channel. Second, the effect of the lending scheme on growth is
almost the same as the effect of the baseline policy. This reveals that the bailout anticipation
channel is actually due to the anticipation that bailouts will help working capital finance,
and not the anticipation of transfers. Third, in all three schemes the effect on promoting
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growth comes from domestic and foreign factors roughly equally. In each case, 55%, 51%,
and 56% of the growth-promoting effect comes from domestic entry and innovation, and the
rest comes from FDI entry and foreign innovation.
Next I study the effect of these three policy schemes on welfare. I compute the welfare
gain/loss from the three policy schemes using the same method as above, namely simulating
the model with each policy 100,000 times with stochastic shocks, and measuring the wel-
fare gain/loss in terms of the permanent consumption gain. Figure 1.11 shows the welfare
gain/loss for each policy scheme for different rates of reserve accumulation. The first observa-
tion is that reserve accumulation alone without any type of bailout cannot improve welfare.
There are two reasons for this result. First, the growth-promoting effect is limited without
bailouts, and thus the long-run gain from higher consumption is smaller. Second, since there
are no bailouts, private agents do not increase foreign borrowing to compensate for reserve
accumulation as much. This reduces short-run consumption even more, and increases the
short-run cost of reserve accumulation. The second observation is that the lending scheme
substantially improves the welfare impact from the reserve policy compared to the no-bailout
scheme. The welfare plot indicates that about 70% of the welfare improvement over the no-
bailout scheme comes from lending, i.e. helping working capital financing. The rest of the
welfare improvement comes from rebating reserves in bailouts. In the lending scheme, pri-
vate agents actually do not receive any rebate of accumulated reserves, and all reserves are
lost from the economy. In contrast, in the baseline policy some of the reserves are rebated
to private agents depending on the number of sudden stops, and thus the loss of resources is
smaller. Since the productivity gain is almost the same between the baseline policy and the
lending scheme, the welfare gap between the baseline policy and the lending scheme comes
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Figure 1.11: Welfare Impact of Different Bailout Schemes




























solely from rebating reserves.
1.7 Evaluation of Reserve Policy
This section conducts the second main analysis of the chapter: evaluation of the actual
reserve policies of developing countries. The last section shows that the optimal reserve
policy and its welfare impact are crucially dependent on the debt-elasticity of the spread
and the FDI entry cost. In the first subsection I estimate the debt-elasticity of the spread
for developing countries from the data. Then I proceed to evaluate whether observed reserve
accumulation policies of developing countries are roughly optimal, and whether the model
can quantitatively explain observed variation in the pace of reserve accumulation across
countries.
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1.7.1 Estimation of Debt-Elasticity of Spread
There is a large amount of literature on the determinants of the interest rate spread in
developing countries.19 I first follow Dell’Erba, Hausmann, and Panizza (2013) and conduct
a parsimonious panel regression to estimate the relationship between the spread and the
debt-to-GDP ratio. The regression equation is given as follows:
Si,t = β0 + β1debtGDPi,t + αi + τ t + εi,t
where Si,t is the interest rate spread on external borrowing in percentage points, αi is a
country-specific fixed effect, τ t is a time-specific fixed effect, and εi,t is an error term. The
data for the spread is taken from JP Morgan’s EMBI Global, as is common in the literature.
Since the available time period of this data is different across countries, this is an unbalanced
panel regression with 22 countries with maximum time period 1994-2015. The debt-to-GDP
ratio is computed using the data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017). The data is annual
and the total number of observations is 379. The result is that β1 is estimated to be 0.0542
with a standard error of 0.0073 and a t-value of 7.45. This means that as the debt-to-
GDP ratio increases by 10%, the spread increases by 54.2 basis points or 0.542%. This is
similar to the results of other papers that include more controls, such as 0.0447 in Dell’Erba,
Hausmann, and Panizza (2013) and 0.0567 in Kennedy and Palerm (2014).
Next I differentiate countries into several groups with different debt-elasticities of the
spread. I found that the number of past defaults is significantly associated with a high
19One of the main interests in the literature is whether the developing countries’spread is determined by
the global factors or the countries’ fundamentals. See for example Kennedy and Palerm (2014) and their
literature review.
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Table 1.5: Estimation of Debt-Elasticity of Spread
Explanatory Variables Coeffi cient (S.E.) t-value
β1: Debt-GDP ratio 0.0205* (0.0107) 1.92
β2: Debt-GDP ratio × Default 0.0177*** (0.0042) 4.23
elasticity of the spread, which is consistent with the findings of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
According to the data in Reinhart (2010), the number of defaults before the sample period
for the sample 22 countries varies from 0 to 9. Accordingly, I divide the sample countries
into five groups with the number of defaults 0 or 1, 2 or 3, 4 or 5, 6 or 7, and 8 or 9, and
assign variables from 0 to 4 for each group. Then I estimate the following regression:
Si,t = β0 + β1debtGDPi,t + β2(debtGDPi,t ×Defaulti) + αi + τ t + εi,t
The result is presented in Table 1.5. This result implies that the debt-elasticity of the spread
for countries with 0 or 1 default is 0.0205, and the elasticity increases by 0.0177 as the number
of defaults increases by two: 0.0382 for 2 or 3 defaults, 0.0559 for 4 or 5 defaults, 0.0736 for
6 or 7 defaults, and 0.0913 for 8 or 9 defaults.
1.7.2 Evaluation of Each Country’s Reserve Policy
Given the estimated debt-elasticity of the spread, this subsection evaluates each country’s
reserve policy. I proceed with the following steps: (1) I adjust the FDI entry cost parame-
ters and innovation step sizes to match the FDI inflow—to-GDP ratio in the model to the
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data.2021 (2) Given the new parameters and given the estimated ψb, I solve the model and
find the optimal reserve accumulation pace τ that maximizes household’s expected utility.
(3) I compute the average pace of reserve accumulation for each country from the data. In
particular, I divide increases in reserve holdings by GDP, both expressed in terms of current
US dollars, for every year from 1991-2010, and take the average across years. The data is
from the World Development Indicators. (4) I solve the model assuming that each country’s
reserve accumulation pace τ corresponds to the data, and compute the expected utility.22
The results are presented in Figure 1.12 and Tables 6.
Figure 1.12 lines up the sample countries in the order of the observed pace of reserve
accumulation from the slowest to the fastest, along with the optimal pace suggested by
the model. Overall, most developing countries are roughly in line with the optimal pace
suggested by the model. The correlation between the actual and the optimal pace of reserve
accumulation across these 22 countries is 0.54. It shows that Panama and Chile may have
more room for welfare gains by accumulating reserves more quickly. On the other hand,
Turkey, Indonesia, and China seem to be accumulating reserves too fast.
Table 1.6 presents more detailed results including the welfare gain/loss by the actual and
optimal pace of reserve accumulation. It can be observed that the welfare gain from the
actual policy is close to the optimal level for many countries. This is because the welfare
gain is not very sensitive to the pace of reserve accumulation around the optimal pace, and
thus a small deviation from the optimal pace does not reduce the welfare gain. Therefore,
20As I did for the baseline model, I assume that 50% of FDI inflow goes into the manufacturing sector.
Accordingly the target is 50% of the FDI—to-GDP ratio for each country.
21It may be too much to let a single FDI entry cost parameter χF explain all the cross-country differences
in the FDI inflow-to-GDP ratio. In the appendix, I alternatively estimate the FDI entry cost using the
Starting a Business Index from the World Bank’s Doing Business Surveys.
22In the model a 1% tax on tradable output corresponds to 0.6% of GDP on average in the first 30 periods.
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many countries are in fact accumulating reserves at the optimal pace or very close to the
optimal in terms of welfare. Looking at each country in detail, most Latin American countries
have high elasticity of the spread because of their default history. This reduces the optimal
pace of reserve accumulation, but most Latin American countries are actually in line with
the optimal pace. Only three countries, China, Indonesia, and Turkey, incur a welfare loss
due to an accumulation pace that is substantially faster than the optimal pace.This overall
result suggests that the debt-elasticity of the foreign borrowing spread and the FDI entry
cost can explain why different countries accumulate reserves at different rates. In countries
with high debt-elasticity of the spread and/or the large FDI entry cost, the optimal pace
of reserve accumulation is slow. If these countries accumulate reserves at a pace similar
to Asian countries such as Malaysia or Thailand, it may cause a large welfare loss through
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Table 1.6: Evaluation of Reserve Accumulation Pace
Country Accum. Pace (%) Welfare (%) Elasticity of FDI Inflow
Actual Optimal Actual Optimal Spread / GDP (%)
Argentine 0.9 0.9 0.05 0.05 0.0736 2.16
Brazil 1.2 0.6 0.01 0.04 0.0913 2.12
Chile 1.2 2.7 0.20 0.21 0.0913 5.57
China 5.0 2.1 -0.13 0.18 0.0382 3.24
Colombia 1.0 1.2 0.08 0.08 0.0736 2.60
Dominican Rep. 0.7 1.2 0.09 0.12 0.0736 3.11
Ecuador 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.02 0.0913 1.67
Egypt 2.3 1.5 0.10 0.13 0.0382 2.62
Hungary 2.5 3.3 0.35 0.37 0.0382 5.05
Indonesia 1.4 0.2 -0.11 0.01 0.0382 0.76
Malaysia 4.3 3.6 0.39 0.39 0.0205 4.69
Mexico 0.8 0.9 0.06 0.06 0.0913 2.48
Panama 0.8 3.6 0.16 0.43 0.0382 6.05
Peru 2.5 1.5 0.07 0.13 0.0913 3.47
Philippines 2.3 1.2 0.01 0.06 0.0205 1.51
Poland 1.6 1.5 0.09 0.13 0.0382 2.71
South Africa 0.8 0.6 0.02 0.02 0.0382 1.22
Thailand 3.4 2.7 0.18 0.21 0.0205 2.96
Tunisia 1.4 1.8 0.16 0.16 0.0559 3.32
Turkey 1.0 0.2 -0.05 0.01 0.0559 1.04
Uruguay 1.4 0.9 0.03 0.06 0.0913 2.44
Venezuela 0.8 0.6 0.04 0.04 0.0913 2.06
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severe crowding-out of investment and/or little gain from FDI. Such over-accumulation could
occur in principle for countries with serial default history and/or small FDI inflows, typically
Latin American countries. However, these countries are not actually accumulating reserves
quickly, and thus are not subject to welfare losses from over-accumulation in practice.
1.8 Conclusion
In the past decade, foreign reserve accumulation by developing countries has been both
an active research area and a central area of policy debate. However, our understanding
regarding the optimal reserve policy and its benefits and costs is still limited. We also
know little about the reason for the wide variation in the amount and the pace of reserve
accumulation across developing countries.
This chapter contributes to our understanding on these issues by developing a quantita-
tive framework to assess the optimal reserve policy, incorporating the key benefits and costs
of reserve accumulation. On the benefit side, I combine elements from two strands of litera-
ture, endogenous growth and sudden stops, to incorporate the growth-promoting effect and
the precautionary effect of reserve accumulation. I also introduce FDI into the endogenous
growth framework, which constitutes an important channel through which reserve accumu-
lation promotes growth. On the cost side, I introduce crowding out of investment resulting
from reserve accumulation.
Using the model, I identify two factors that are important determinants of the optimal
pace of reserve accumulation: the debt-elasticity of the interest rate spread, and the FDI
entry cost. In countries with a high debt-elasticity of the spread, active reserve accumulation
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severely crowds out investment, which reduces the growth-promoting effect. In countries with
large FDI entry costs, reserve policies are not effective in attracting FDI, and the growth-
promoting effect is limited. In these cases, the optimal pace of reserve accumulation is slower,
and the welfare gain is limited.
I show that both real depreciation by reserve accumulation in normal times and bailouts
during sudden stops are important in terms of both the productivity gain and the welfare
gain. Quantitative analysis shows that 72% of the growth-promoting effect comes from real
depreciation by reserve accumulation in normal times, and 28% is from the anticipation of
future bailouts in sudden stops. I also show that real depreciation alone cannot improve
welfare without bailouts, and 70% of the welfare gain from bailouts comes from helping to
finance working capital payment.
Accounting for differences in the debt-elasticity of the spread and the FDI entry cost
across countries, most developing countries are roughly in line with the optimal pace of
reserve accumulation suggested by the model. This result implies that these two factors can
explain a substantial amount of the cross-country variation in the observed pace of reserve
accumulation.
In addition, the model developed in this chapter provides a useful framework to study
broader research areas. One possible extension is to introduce a pecuniary externality into
the borrowing constraint, as in Mendoza (2010) and Bianchi and Mendoza (2013), and to
study optimal macroprudential policies. The key difference from their models is that the
model in this chapter has endogenous growth, thus enabling the study of the interaction
between macroprudential policies and growth. It is important to incorporate growth into
the framework because countries subject to a sudden stop of capital inflows are developing
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countries, which grow faster than the rest of the world during tranquil times. The model here
also incorporates innovations by heterogeneous firms in the endogenous growth framework,
as originally developed in Ates and Saffi e (2016). Thus the model enables the study of the
effects of policy on various types of firms.
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2 Firm and Trade Dynamics in Sudden Stops
2.1 Introduction
Business cycles in emerging economies are characterized by volatile international capital
flows. In particular, sudden stops of capital inflows often cause severe economic downturns
such as declines in production, consumption, and asset prices. Theoretical literature has
made important progresses in capturing these events by embedding financial frictions into
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, represented by the seminal work by
Mendoza (2010). This literature has studied optimal policies such as capital controls to pre-
vent sudden stops (see Bianchi (2011), Benigno, Chen, Otrok, Rebucci, and Young (2013),
Benigno, Chen, Otrok, Rebucci, and Young (2016) for example). However, empirical studies
have revealed that the effects of sudden stops are not limited to aggregate production and
consumption. First, real exchange rate depreciation during sudden stops causes contrasting
dynamics in imports and exports, mainly through the extensive margins (Alessandria, Ka-
boski, and Midrigan (2010), Alessandria, Pratap, and Yue (2015)). Second, the growth rate
of the economy declines during sudden stops, and the output level hardly recovers its origi-
nal trend, pointing to persistent losses in productivity (Cerra and Saxena (2008), Blanchard,
Cerutti, and Summers (2015)). Third, sudden stops affect firm entry and innovation at the
micro level, which causes a persistent effect on economic growth (Ates and Saffi e (2016)).
These elements are important in designing optimal policies to deal with volatile capital flows,
but most existing papers miss these elements.
This chapter develops a framework that can incorporate all of these elements. The key
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novelty of our model is twofold. First, economic growth and the extensive margins of imports
and exports are determined by endogenous firm dynamics. Second, sudden stops affect non-
exporting and exporting firms differently. In particular, non-exporting firms reduce profits
during sudden stops, while exporting firms increase profits by taking advantage of the lower
relative marginal cost compared to foreign rival firms. The model is a small open economy
with tradable and non-tradable sectors. The final tradable sector produces goods using a
variety of differentiated intermediate goods. These intermediate goods are produced by many
domestic and foreign firms, and through new firm entry and incumbent firms’innovation,
productivity of the intermediate sector increases endogenously. Whether each type of good is
imported or exported is determined by firms’endogenous activities. Firms own and produce
several types of intermediate goods. For each product line, firms invest in innovation to start
exporting to the foreign market. When they succeed in innovation, they start exporting their
products to the foreign market. Conversely, if foreign firms succeed in innovation, which
happens with an exogenous probability, this country starts importing goods from those
foreign firms. Sudden stops are modeled following Bianchi and Mendoza (2018). There is
a fixed amount of productive asset in the economy, which is used as a collateral for foreign
borrowing. When stochastic shocks to aggregate productivity and the interest rate switch
from a good state to a bad state, the borrowing constraint binds. The binding constraint
then reduces the asset price and tightens the borrowing constraint further, which amplifies
the effect of a bad shock on the economy. During sudden stop events, non-exporting firms
face lower domestic demand and reduce profits. In contrast, exporting firms increase profits
because sudden stops reduce the real wage and the relative marginal cost compared to foreign
rival firms. Then firms invest more to export, and the extensive margin of exports expands
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gradually.
In the quantitative analysis, we solve the model using a version of the policy-function
iteration method to deal with an occasionally binding borrowing constraint. The model
is calibrated to the Brazilian economy as a benchmark. We simulate the model for many
periods and take the average dynamics of the economy around sudden stop episodes. We find
that the model captures the aggregate dynamics of sudden stops quantitatively well. Sudden
stops are likely to happen when a good exogenous shock of high aggregate productivity and
a low interest rate is followed by a bad shock of low productivity and a high interest rate.
This is consistent with the sudden stop dynamics in Mendoza (2010). When the borrowing
constraint binds, the asset price drops by almost 5%, and the debt-to-GDP ratio shrinks by
1%. Sudden stops also cause a drop in GDP of 1% and consumption of 2% from their trends.
More importantly, firm and trade dynamics in the model are consistent with some of the
empirical evidence reported in the literature. First, new entry and incumbent firms’inno-
vation substantially decline during sudden stops. This slows down aggregate productivity
growth and in turn has a persistent negative effect on GDP, consistent with the empirical
findings in Cerra and Saxena (2008) and Blanchard, Cerutti, and Summers (2015). Second,
while imports of intermediate goods decline during sudden stops, exports of intermediate
goods are not affected, which is roughly in line with empirical facts documented in Alessan-
dria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010) and Alessandria, Pratap, and Yue (2015). Moreover,
profits from exporting rise by 9% relative to the trend and stay higher for several years
after sudden stops. This is because a drop in the real wage reduces the relative marginal
cost of production compared to foreign rival firms. Firms then invest more in innovation to
export, and the extensive margin of exports expands gradually, which is also consistent with
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the empirical fact shown in Alessandria, Pratap, and Yue (2015). In short, our model can
capture several empirical regularities about sudden stops that most existing papers miss.
One additional feature of the model is that the model structure allows us to have the
firm-level moments at least at the balanced growth path, such as the firm size distribution
in terms of output, profit, and factor inputs, for the entire firms and also for exporters and
non-exporters separately. We plan to use these firm-level moments for calibration in future
research. We discuss this point below in the model section and in the appendix.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 2.3 introduces the model. Section 2.4 presents calibration of the model
and the quantitative analysis. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
The key contribution of our work is that we bridge two strands of existing literature to pro-
vide a tractable framework to study firm and trade dynamics during sudden stops. The first
strand is the literature on the relationship between short-run shocks and long-run growth.
Comin and Gertler (2006) develop a model in which short-run shocks to the economy causes
medium-term business cycles using a product-variety expansion type of endogenous growth
framework. Following Comin and Gertler (2006), Queralto (2015) introduces a financial
intermediary into a similar growth framework to explain a persistent loss in total factor pro-
ductivity after the sudden stop in Korea. Gornemann (2015) also adopts a similar framework
to capture a persistent output loss after sovereign crises. Ates and Saffi e (2016) introduce
a financial selection of new firm entry into a version of the Schumpeterian growth model
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developed by Klette and Kortum (2004), and show that sudden stops have a persistent effect
on growth through the composition of new firm entry. The firm dynamics and growth part
of our model is based on Ates and Saffi e (2016). The key difference from this literature is
that we model sudden stops as an occasionally binding borrowing constraint with an en-
dogenous collateral value, so that the model provides a framework to study optimal capital
policies in the context of endogenous firm dynamics. We also incorporate heterogeneous in-
novations and trade dynamics into the model. Clementi and Palazzo (2016) and Akcigit and
Kerr (2015) point to the importance of heterogeneous firm and innovation dynamics in the
short run and in the long run. Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010) and Alessandria,
Pratap, and Yue (2015) show that crises have contrasting effects on imports and exports
through sharp devaluations.
The second strand is the literature that studies optimal policies to manage capital flows,
following the seminal work by Mendoza (2010). Bianchi (2011) studies optimal policies
to deal with over-borrowing by private agents in an endowment economy. Benigno, Chen,
Otrok, Rebucci, and Young (2016) use the same model as in Bianchi (2011) and study several
alternative policies to manage over-borrowing. Jeanne and Korinek (2013) set up a stylized
three-period model and study the optimal combination of ex-ante and ex-post policies to
deal with over-borrowing. Benigno, Chen, Otrok, Rebucci, and Young (2013) also study
ex-ante and ex-post policies in a dynamic model with endogenous production of tradable
and non-tradable goods. The key contribution of our work to this literature is that we
incorporate endogenous firm dynamics and growth, so that the model enables us to study
the interaction between capital policies and growth. Ma (2017) sets up a model with both
endogenous growth and an occasionally binding borrowing constraint with an externality,
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and studies the optimal ex-ante and ex-post policies. Our model differs from his work in
that our model has heterogeneous firm dynamics and also trade dynamics, both of which are
relevant for designing optimal policies.
2.3 Model
The model framework is based on an infinite-horizon small open economy with tradable and
non-tradable sectors. The key features of the model are endogenous firm dynamics and the
extensive margins of imports and exports. The final tradable goods producers use a variety
of differentiated intermediate goods for production. These intermediate goods are produced
by domestic and foreign intermediate firms. The intermediate sector is modeled as a version
of the Schumpeterian growth model developed by Ates and Saffi e (2016), which is a discrete
time version of Klette and Kortum (2004) that incorporates aggregate risk. We extend
their framework in two dimensions. First, domestic firms invest in two types of innovations:
innovations to acquire more product lines, and innovations to start exporting. Second, there
are endogenous extensive margins of imports and exports. When firms succeed in innovation
to start exporting, they start exporting their products to the foreign market. Conversely,
if foreign firms succeed in innovation, this country imports goods from those foreign firms.
These extensive margins of imports and exports endogenously shift over time through firm
dynamics.
The overview of the model environment is presented in Figure 2.1. The final tradable
goods producers use a variety of differentiated intermediate goods produced by domestic and
foreign firms. They also borrow from abroad using a non-contingent one-period bond and
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Figure 2.1: Model Economy
within-period working capital financing. They are subject to shocks to aggregate productiv-
ity and the interest rate on the foreign bond. Because households in this model do not have
direct access to the international financial market, tradable goods producers borrow from
abroad to smooth consumption on behalf of households. Domestic and foreign intermediate
firms produce intermediate goods using labor and productive assets, both internationally im-
mobile. There are endogenous extensive margins of imports and exports as explained above.
Non-tradable firms produce goods using labor and sell output to households. Households
consume tradable and non-tradable goods, and supply labor to the domestic intermediate
firms. Next we turn to the characterization of each agent.
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2.3.1 Final Tradable Goods Producer
The final tradable good is the numeraire of this model economy, and its price is normalized
at one. The representative tradable goods producer uses unit-mass variety of intermediate
goods {yt(i)}1i=0 to produce output Y Tt :








where εAt is a stochastic productivity shock. Before production materializes, a fixed fraction φ
of the cost of intermediate goods needs to be paid. This working capital payment is financed
by within-period borrowing from abroad with no interest cost. In addition, the tradable
goods producer borrows from abroad using a one-period non-contingent bond. These foreign







where κ is a fixed parameter on the collateral value, Bt is bond holdings in period t, Lt−1
is the amount of internationally immobile productive asset (land) holdings by final tradable
producers, and Qt is the asset price. Productive assets are used for production by intermedi-
ate firms, and final tradable producers earn rental rates RLt from intermediate firms. These
assets are in fixed unit supply, and the market clearing condition is Lt = 1. Final trad-
able producers are owned by households, thus they discount future profits using households’
discount rate.23 Given these settings, the maximization problem by the representative final
23The assumption that final tradable producers instead of households borrow from abroad and own assets
is just to make algebra simpler. Even if households borrow from abroand and own assets, it would be an
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where λt is the marginal utility of tradable goods consumption by households, pt(i) is the
price of intermediate good i, and exp(εRt )R is a stochastic gross interest rate on the for-
eign bond. Each period, the final tradable producer chooses intermediate goods demand
{yt(i)}1i=0, productive asset holdings Lt, and foreign bond holdings Bt to maximize the ex-
pected profit discounted by household’s discount rate adjusted by the marginal utility λt.
Let µt denote the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint (2.2). The first-order


















Bt : λt − µt = βR exp(εRt )Et(λt+1) (2.6)











= 0, µt ≥ 0 (2.7)
The first equation is the demand function for intermediate goods. When the borrowing
constraint is slack, µt = 0 and the demand function for intermediate goods (2.4) is the
standard one equating price and marginal product. When the borrowing constraint binds,
strictly positive µt appears as the external financing premium on working capital payments,
which increases the effective cost of inputs. Equation (2.5) is the Euler equation with respect
to productive asset holdings. As explained in Bianchi and Mendoza (2018), the asset price Qt
reflects the discounted future marginal product of assets RLt+s discounted by the asset return.
Equation (2.6) is the Euler equation with respect to foreign bond holdings. Given that λt is
the marginal utility of tradable goods consumption by households, it is the standard Euler
equation except when the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint µt appears. This
term captures the external financing premium on foreign debt when the borrowing constraint
binds, which increases the effective real interest rate on foreign debt, as explained in Mendoza
(2010). The last equation (2.7) is the complementary slackness condition for the borrowing
constraint.
2.3.2 Intermediate Firms
There is a unit-mass variety of differentiated intermediate goods in the tradable sector,
indexed by i. These intermediate goods are produced by domestic and foreign firms. Each
firm produces one or more product line(s) across these intermediate goods. This section
explains static production and profits in the intermediate sector. The next section explains
firm dynamics.
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Intermediate firms use productive assets and labor for production. Because these produc-
tion resources are internationally immobile, domestic firms use domestic assets and labor,
and foreign firms use foreign assets and labor. Firms produce intermediate goods using the
following production function:
yt = at (`t)
α (ht)
1−α (2.8)
where at is productivity, `t is asset input, and ht is labor input. Productivity is heterogeneous
across firms. There are potentially many firms, including domestic and foreign firms, that
could produce each type of intermediate good. To see which firm actually produces each type
of good, let us focus on the demand for intermediate goods by the final tradable producer
given by (2.4). Because this is a unit-elastic demand function, the profit-maximizing behavior
would be to set the price infinitely high if a seller was monopolistic.24 In this model, however,
there are rival firms which can produce the same type of good, and they would set a slightly
lower price and steal the demand. Therefore, through Bertrand competition, the firm with
the lowest marginal cost sets the price equal to the marginal cost for the second-best rival
firm, and monopolizes demand. As a result, only the firm with the lowest marginal cost
produces each type of good.
The marginal cost of producing intermediate goods for each firm depends on three ele-
ments. The first elements are the production factor prices, namely the asset rental rate RLt
and labor wage Wt. These costs are symmetric across all domestic firms, but foreign firms
face foreign factor prices, RL∗t and W
∗
t . The second element is whether goods are exported
or sold domestically. We assume international trade is subject to a symmetric iceberg cost,
24To see this, note that unit-elastic demand implies that sales, price times quantity, are independent of
price. By setting the price infinitely high, quantity would be zero. In this case, sellers could earn the same
sales with no production cost, which maximizes the profit.
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and firms need to ship 1 + ξ units of goods to export 1 unit of goods. The third element
is the productivity of each firm. Different firms have different productivity across different
product lines.
As explained in the next section on firm dynamics, firms need to make innovation to
export their products. Before making innovation to export, firms can sell their products
only domestically. Once a firm innovates to export, previous exporters lose their access to
the foreign market because their products become obsolete. This means that there is at most
one firm that can export their products. This assumption divides product lines into three
types: domestic lines, exporting lines, and importing lines. For domestic lines, domestic
firms produce intermediate goods, and there is no trade. The second-best rival firms are also
domestic firms. For exporting lines, domestic firms sell their products not only domestically
but also export to the foreign market. In this case, the second-best rival firms are domestic
firms in the domestic market, and foreign firms in the foreign market. For importing lines,
the final tradable producers of this economy import goods from foreign firms. The second-
best rival firms are domestic firms. Hereafter we use D, X, M to denote these three types of
product lines. Next we elaborate on firms’production, price setting, and profits for each of
three types of lines.
(D) Domestic lines
For domestic lines, domestic firms produce intermediate goods to the domestic final
tradable producer. The second-best rival firms are also domestic firms. Because the factor
prices are symmetric across all domestic firms, the only difference between the producing
firm and the rival firms are the productivity. As explained in the next section, the producing
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firms for domestic lines have 1 + σD productivity lead over the rival firms. Let at(i) denote
the productivity level of the producing firm for product line i. Then the marginal cost for











1−α = pDt (i) (2.9)
where α = α−α(1 − α)−(1−α). Recall that the optimal price is equal to the marginal cost
for the second-best rival firms. Thus, this is the optimal price that the producing firms set,
which we denote by pt(i). The profit for the producing firm is then given by:
πDt (i) = pt(i)yt(i)−RLt `t(i)−Wtht(i)
Combining with the demand function from the final tradable producers (2.4), the profit can









There are three things to note. First, the profit does not depend on the productivity level
specific to the product line at(i). In the appendix, we show that asset and labor inputs for
each product line also do not depend on the productivity. This property enables us to study
the aggregate dynamics of the economy without keeping track of heterogeneous productivity
levels across product lines. Second, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint µt
affects the profit. In particular, when the borrowing constraint binds, µt is strictly positive
and the profit declines. This is because when the borrowing constraint binds, the final
tradable producer reduces demand for intermediate goods. Lower demand then translates
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into lower profits for intermediate firms. Third, factor prices do not affect profits. The
reason is as follows. When domestic factor prices become cheaper, production cost for the
producing firm goes down. But at the same time, the optimal price goes down because the
marginal cost for the rival firms also goes down. These cancel out each other and thus the
profit is not affected by a change in domestic factor prices. This makes a clear contrast to
the case of exports discussed below.
(X) Exporting lines
For exporting lines, domestic firms sell their products not only domestically but also in
the foreign market. Price setting and profit in the domestic market are essentially the same
as domestic lines, except that the producing firms on exporting lines have larger productivity
lead over the domestic rival firms, which is denoted by 1 +σX . The optimal price and profit




















Because the productivity lead is larger, a profit is also larger.
In the foreign market, foreign final tradable producers demand intermediate goods. To
specify foreign demand, we assume the following production function by foreign countries:






Foreign production is not subject to any shocks, and Y ∗t grows at a constant rate. Then





This is again a unit-elastic demand function, thus the same logic holds and the firm with
the lowest marginal cost sets the price equal to the marginal cost for the second-best rival
firms. In the foreign market, the second-best rival firms are foreign firms. Foreign firms use











1−α = p∗t (i) (2.14)
This is the price that domestic exporting firms set in the foreign market. Domestic exporters
are subject to an iceberg cost, and need to ship 1+ξ units of goods to export 1 unit of goods.



















The key difference from a domestic profit is that a profit from exporting depends on fac-
tor prices. In particular, when domestic factor prices RLt and Wt decline, the profit be-
comes higher. This is because a decline in domestic factor prices makes domestic production
cheaper, while the price is still determined by the foreign factor prices. Therefore in this
case the profit goes up.
85
(M) Importing lines
For importing lines, the final tradable producer imports intermediate goods from foreign
firms. Recall that demand by the final tradable producer is unit-elastic given by (2.4). This






But we still need to know the price pt(i), because the price determines the amount of imports
yt(i), which affects production of final tradable goods Y Tt . As discussed above, the price is
equal to the marginal cost for the second-best rival firm, which is a domestic firm in this
case. As shown in the next section, we assume that the productivity lead by foreign firms
is the same as domestic exporting firms, 1 + σX . Then the optimal price is exactly the
same as the case for exporting lines, which is given by (2.11). Note that in equation (2.16),
Y Tt / (1 + φµt/λt) is given and pt(i) is the same as case for exporting lines. This means that
output yt(i) is also the same as exporting lines.25
This completes the exposition of static production and profits for intermediate firms.
Table 2.1 summarizes three product lines. Next we turn to the firm dynamics and explain
how productivity increases over time along with imports and exports of intermediate goods.
2.3.3 Innovation and Firm Dynamics
Each firm is a collection of product lines for which the firm has the highest productivity.
Firm dynamics are characterized by new firm entry, innovation by incumbent firms, and
25The profit can be different between the domestic exporting firms and foreign firms, because factor prices
are different and foreign firms are subject to an iceberg cost. But profits for foreign firms are out of our
interest.
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Table 2.1: Three Types of Product Lines
type (symbol) who produces second-best rival profit


























Importing (M) foreign firm domestic firm not relevant
innovation by foreign firms. Figure 2.2 illustrates an example of the evolution of firms from
one period to the next. In the top figure, domestic firm 1 produces two product lines, both
of which are domestic lines. Domestic firm 2 produces three product lines, of which the first
two are exporting and the last line is domestic. There is also one foreign product line. In the
model, domestic firms invest in two types of innovation: innovation to acquire new domestic
product lines, and innovation to make their own domestic product line to be an exporting
line. The bottom figure shows one possible case in the next period. In this example, domestic
firm 1 succeeds in an exporting innovation on product line 1, and now this product line is
exporting with 1 + σX productivity lead over other firms. For product line 3, domestic firm
1 succeeds in a domestic innovation and acquires this line. A domestic innovation improves
productivity of the line by a factor of 1 + σD. Foreign innovation happens on any product
line with an exogenous probability iF . In this figure, foreign innovation happens on product
line 5, and domestic firm 2 loses this product line. Foreign innovation improves productivity
by a factor of 1+σX . There is also new domestic firm entry, not depicted in this figure. New
domestic firm entry can happen on any product line, and a new firm starts with a single
domestic product line with 1 + σD productivity lead.
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Figure 2.2: Firm Dynamics
Through entry and innovations, aggregate productivity of the intermediate sector in-
creases over time. In addition, these firm dynamics endogenously determine which product
lines are imported and exported. Firm dynamics change the status of each product line
over time and determine the extensive margins of imports and exports. Next we explain the
innovation decisions by firms.
Innovation by Domestic Incumbent Firms Let us consider a domestic firm that pro-
duces nD domestic product lines and nX exporting product lines. We model innovations by
firms in the following way.
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(1) Domestic innovation
A firm with nD domestic lines and nX exporting lines has nD + nX domestic innovation
opportunities in total. For each innovation opportunity, a firm invests ZDt units of final
tradable goods to make a domestic innovation to acquire new domestic product lines. The
idea behind this assumption is that a domestic innovation is a spin-off from the existing
technologies. Success in each innovation gives one new domestic product line. This implies
that a firm with nD domestic lines and nX exporting lines can acquire nD+nX new domestic








where At is the average productivity of intermediate firms including foreign firms. This
functional form for innovation is consistent with Akcigit and Kerr (2015), and shown to
be empirically supported. A firm with nD domestic lines and nX exporting lines invest
(nD + nX)ZDt units of final tradable goods in total.
(2) Exporting innovation
For each domestic product line, a firm invests ZXt units of final tradable goods to make









When a firm succeeds in an exporting innovation on their own domestic line, this line becomes
an exporting line and the firm can export this type of good to the foreign market.
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As is common in Schumpeterian growth models, innovation is undirected in the sense
that innovation is equally likely to apply to any product line. This feature is preserved
in this model by the structure that the operating profit is independent of the productivity
level. Undirected innovations by many firms imply that each product line faces the same
replacement probability. Let dt denote the replacement probability, and define as P (i, n, p)
the probability of having i successes in n trials for a binomial process with success probability
p. Namely,






The value of a domestic firm with nD domestic lines and nX exporting lines can be written
in a recursive form as follows:
Vt(n








P (i, nD + nX , iDt )
nD∑
j=0
P (j, nD, dt)
nD−j∑
k=0
P (k, nD − j, (1− dt)iXt )
nX∑
m=0




D + i− j − k, nX + k −m)
]}
The first line is the operating profits minus the innovation investment cost. The second
and third line add up the expected value of a firm across all the possible combinations
of innovations and replacement on nD domestic lines and nX exporting lines in the next
period. The first summation adds up across all the possibilities for domestic innovations
from 0 success to nD + nX successes. The second summation adds up over the number of
domestic lines being replaced from 0 to nD. The third summation adds up over the number
of successful exporting innovations. We assume that exporting innovations materialize only
if replacement does not happen on that line. Thus the effective success probability is given
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by (1−dt)iXt . The last summation adds up over the number of exporting lines being replaced
from 0 to nX .
Following Ates and Saffi e (2016), we use a guess-and-verify method to show that the
value of a firm with nD domestic lines and nX exporting lines is equal to the sum of nD
times the value of a single domestic line and nX times the value of a single exporting line:
Vt(n
D, nX) = nDVt(1, 0) + n
XVt(0, 1)
The formal proof is left to the Appendix. This linear relation enables us to aggregate the
firm dynamics in a tractable way and study how the firm dynamics affect endogenous growth
and the extensive margins of imports and exports, without keeping track of the firm size
distribution. The value of a single domestic line is given by:





πDt − ZDt − ZXt (2.19)
+
(
iDt + (1− dt)(1− iXt )
)
Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(1, 0)] + (1− dt)iXt Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(0, 1)]
}
and the value of a single exporting product line is:





t − ZDt + iDt Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(1, 0)] + (1− dt)Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(0, 1)]
}
(2.20)
Taking into account equation (2.17), the first-order condition with respect to ZDt gives the
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Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(1, 0)] = 1 (2.21)










(Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(0, 1)]− Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(1, 0)]) = 1 (2.22)
Assuming ρ > 1, the probability of successful innovation is increasing and concave in invest-
ment. Note also that investment is forward-looking in the sense that as the expected value
of a product line increases, firms invest more in innovation.
Domestic Entry Entry of new domestic firms comes from innovation by households. New
domestic firms poach a product line from incumbent firms, and start with a single domestic
line. Households invest ZEt units of final tradable goods to create new firms. The number of








The optimal investment ZEt equates that the marginal benefit of investment to the marginal









Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(1, 0)] = 1 (2.24)
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Productivity Growth and Extensive Margins of Trade We now characterize how
firm dynamics translate into macroeconomic dynamics, specifically productivity growth and
the extensive margins of trade. We denote the share of domestic lines by θDt , and the share
of exporting lines by θXt . Then the share of importing product lines is given by 1− θDt − θXt .
First, replacement of a product line happens for three reasons: domestic entry, domestic








t + et + i
F (2.25)
Note that the successful innovation probability by incumbent firms iDt is multiplied by the
share of domestically-owned product lines, a sum of domestic lines and exporting lines.
Next we derive the transition equation of the share of domestic lines θDt . θ
D
t increases by
new domestic firm entry and domestic innovations by incumbent firms. θDt decreases by
exporting innovations and foreign innovations. The transition of θDt is thus given by the
following law of motion:
θDt = θ
D
t−1 + (1− θDt−1)(et + (θDt−1 + θXt−1)iDt )− θDt−1((1− dt)iXt + iF ) (2.26)
The transition equation of the share of exporting lines θXt is derived in a similar way. θ
X
t
increases by exporting innovations, and decreases by any of domestic entry, domestic inno-






t−1(1− dt)iXt − θXt−1(et + (θDt−1 + θXt−1)iDt + iF ) (2.27)
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The share of foreign lines are then given by 1 − θDt − θXt . As discussed above, this country
imports foreign intermediate goods. Therefore, endogenous variations in the share of foreign
product lines correspond to the extensive margin of imports. And endogenous variations in
the shares of exporting lines determine the extensive margin of exports.
Next we derive the expressions for aggregate production and productivity growth. Ag-
gregate production of final tradable goods can be written as follows:































t are labor hired by
each product line. Note that `Mt and h
M
t are factors in foreign countries. Expressions for







At grows as productivity of each product line at(i) improves through domestic firm entry,
incumbent innovations, and foreign innovations.26 The growth rate of At is thus characterized
by the following equation:
At+1
At







t (1 + σX)θ
D
t−1(1−dt)iXt (1 + σX)i
F
(2.28)
The three terms in the right-hand side correspond respectively to the sum of new firm entry
and domestic innovations, exporting innovations, and foreign innovations. This completes
26Note that At is not necessarily the productivity level of this economy, because At includes prouctivity
of foreign firms. But the long-run growth rate of this economy is determined by growth in At.
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the characterization of firm dynamics and its effect on aggregate productivity growth and
the extensive margins of imports and exports.
Firm-Level Distribution We model the firm and trade dynamics so that it is tractable
enough to solve numerically with an occasionally binding borrowing constraint. But at the
same time, the model structure allows us to have the firm-level moments such as the size
distribution and the share of exporting firms, at least at the balanced growth path. This
section sketches some of the model features.
In our model, each firm is characterized by the number of domestic and exporting lines
it owns, (nD, nX). Each domestic and exporting line has the same output, profit, and factor
inputs respectively. Therefore, it is easy to compute output, profit, and factor inputs for
firms with different sizes. In addition, we can derive the whole distribution of the firm size
in terms of the number of product lines. The detailed process is left to the appendix, but
basically we iterate the laws of motion for firm size until the firm size distribution converges.
Using the firm size distribution, we can compute the firm-level moments such as the mean and
standard deviations of output, profit, and factor inputs. We can also derive these statistics
for exporters and non-exporters separately, and compute the relative mean size between
exporters and non-exporters. We plan to use these firm-level moments for calibration in
future research.
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2.3.4 Non-Tradable Goods Producer
The non-tradable firm hires labor from households and produces non-tradable goods. The
production function is given as follows:




where 0 < 1 − αN < 1 is the labor share in non-tradable goods production. We assume
that total factor productivity in non-tradable goods production increases at the same rate
as aggregate productivity in the tradable sector. This spillover guarantees that production
of tradable goods and non-tradable goods will grow at the same rate in the long run. Let
PNt denote the non-tradable goods price. Since the law of one price holds for tradable
goods between this country and the rest of the world, the non-tradable goods price PNt
determines the real exchange rate of this country. Thus we call PNt the real exchange rate,
and an increase in PNt corresponds to real appreciation. The first-order condition of the
non-tradable goods producer is simply given by:
Wt = P
N
t At(1− αN)(HNt )−α
N
(2.30)
Because labor is mobile between the tradable and non-tradable sectors, the real wage Wt is







which is paid to households.
2.3.5 Household
The representative household consumes tradable goods CTt and non-tradable goods C
N
t ,
supplies labor Ht elastically, and invests ZEt units of final tradable goods in domestic en-
try. They receive the wage income WtLt and profits from tradable goods producers ΠTt ,













. The representative household’s optimization problem is then given as
follows:
max














































where γ is a parameter to determine the weight of tradable goods in composite consumption
Ct, and ε is the constant elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable con-
sumption. Optimal investment in domestic entry ZEt is determined by equation (2.24). The





























Then the stochastic discount factor Λt,t+1 is given by Λt,t+1 = βλt+1/λt. Equation (2.34)
relates the optimal ratio of tradable and non-tradable consumption to the real exchange rate.
Equation (2.35) gives the optimal labor supply Ht.
2.3.6 Market Clearing Conditions
To close the model, this subsection lists the market clearing conditions. The asset market,























Y Nt = C
N
t (2.39)
Finally, the trade balance and the current account of this economy are given as follows:
TBt = Y
T






− θXt−1ZDt︸ ︷︷ ︸







Y ∗t︸ ︷︷ ︸
export of intermediate goods
−
(
1− θDt−1 − θXt−1
) Y Tt
1 + φµt/λt︸ ︷︷ ︸
import of intermediate goods
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Bt−1 = Bt −Bt−1
This completes the exposition of the model economy. The appendix formally defines the
equilibrium of the model economy and the stationarized equilibrium conditions that we use
to solve the model numerically.
2.4 Quantitative Analysis
This section calibrates the model parameters, demonstrates the baseline simulation, and
discusses the model features. We solve the model numerically by two steps: First we divide
the equilibrium conditions by the productivity level At to stationarize the equations. In
the second step we solve the stationarized model globally using a version of the policy
function iteration algorithm to deal with the occasionally binding borrowing constraint.
The stationarized equilibrium conditions and the details of the solution procedure are left
to the appendix.
2.4.1 Calibration
One period in the model is meant to be annual. There are 17 parameters to be determined
in the model. We take conventional values from the literature if available, and calibrate
the other parameters to target the Brazilian economy as a benchmark. Table 2.2 presents
12 externally-determined parameter values. The discount factor β = 0.96 and interest rate
on foreign bonds R = 1.04 are standard values for annual models. The weight on tradable
goods in consumption γ = 0.31 is set following Bianchi (2011). The elasticity of substitution
between tradable and non-tradable goods in consumption, ε = 0.6, is in the middle of the
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Table 2.2: Externally-Determined Parameters
Variable Value Source
β Discount factor 0.96 Standard
R Foreign bond interest rate 1.04 Standard
γ Tradable share in consumption 0.31 Bianchi (2011)
ε CES between T and NT 0.6 Middle value in literature
ω Frisch elasticity 1/(ω − 1) 1.455 Mendoza (1991)
α Asset share in tradable 0.3 Standard
1− αN Labor share in non-tradable 0.75 Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016)
ξ iceberg cost 0.21 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
φ Fraction of input subject to WK 0.4 Middle value in literature
κ Coeffi cient on borrowing constraint 0.14 Mendoza (2010)
ρ Concavity of innovation investment 1.5 Middle value in literature
iF Foreign innovation rate 0.01 Domestic entry rate
range discussed in Mendoza (2005). The parameter for the labor supply elasticity ω = 1.455
is set following Mendoza (1991). Regarding the production parameters, asset’s share in
tradable production α = 0.3 is a standard value, and labor’s share in non-tradable production
1 − αN = 0.75 is taken from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016). The iceberg cost of exports
ξ = 0.21 follows the estimation by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). The fraction of the
input cost subject to the working capital requirement φ varies widely depending on how it is
estimated. We set its value to 0.4, which is in the middle of the range in the literature such
as Mendoza (2010) and Ates and Saffi e (2016). The coeffi cient on the borrowing constraint
κ is set to 0.14, which is close to 0.2 assumed in Mendoza (2010). The concavity parameter
governing investment ρ is set to 1.5, which is the middle value in the literature such as
Comin and Gertler (2006), Akcigit and Kerr (2015), and their literature review. The foreign
innovation rate is set to 0.01, which is somewhat arbitrarily set to a low value so that
the economy grows mainly through domestic innovation.Five parameters related to firm
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Table 2.3: Jointly-Determined Parameters
Variable Value Target Model
ηE Domestic entry coeff. 1.30 GDP growth rate 2.5% 2.5%
ηD Domestic innovation coeff. 0.71 Import/GDP ratio 12.8% 12.8%
ηX Exporting innovation coeff. 0.68 Export/GDP ratio 12.8% 12.8%
σD Domestic innovation size 0.11 R&D expenditure/GDP 1.0% 3.2%
σX Exporting innovation size 0.47 Labor share in tradable 21.7% 27.8%
dynamics and growth, ηE, ηD, ηX , σD, σX , are jointly determined to match five moments at
the balanced growth path of the model with Brazilian data in 2001-2011. The five targeted
moments are the GDP growth rate, the import-to-GDP ratio, the export-to-GDP ratio, the
R&D expenditure-to-GDP ratio, and the labor share in the tradable sector. Parameter values
and targeted moments are listed in Table 2.3.The aggregate shocks to the economy affect
the productivity of the final tradable sector εAt and the interest rate on the foreign bond ε
R
t .
We take the stochastic process for these shocks from Mendoza (2010), in which εAt and ε
R
t
follow a joint discrete Markov process with two realizations for each variable. In particular,
εAt takes ±0.0134 and εRt takes ±0.0196 with the same autocorrelation 0.59 and the negative
correlation -0.67 between εAt and ε
R
t . We set Y
∗
t so that the total revenue for exporting
product lines is 2.1 times larger than that for domestic product lines at the balanced growth
path. Alfaro, Chari, and Kanczuk (2017) report that the revenue for exporting firms is 2.1
times larger than that for non-exporting firms. As discussed above, each firm in our model
can have several product lines, and each product line is actually not corresponding to each
firm. We plan to use the firm-level moments for calibration in the next draft. Finally, foreign
production cost RL∗t andW
∗
t are set to the domestic values R
L
t andWt at the balanced growth
path, taking into account that this country and foreign countries have a close productivity
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level.
2.4.2 Sudden Stop Dynamics
This section presents sudden stop dynamics in the model. We pick all sudden stop events
from the 9,000-period simulation described above. Following Bianchi and Mendoza (2018),
sudden stops are identified as events in which the current account adjusted for its trend
is at least two standard deviations above its mean. With this definition of sudden stops,
the unconditional probability of sudden stops in the model is 7.9%, which is in line with
empirical estimations in Eichengreen, Gupta, and Mody (2006) and Jeanne and Rancière
(2011). Figure 2.3 plots the average dynamics of the key macro variables before and after
sudden stops in the simulation. The three panels in the top row show log deviations of real
GDP, consumption, and the asset price from their linear trends.27 On average, GDP drops
by 1%, consumption drops by 2%, and the asset price drops by 5% when a sudden stop
happens. The sharp drop in the asset price indicates that the borrowing limit substantially
tightens during sudden stops, and an amplification effect sets in motion as in Mendoza (2010)
and Bianchi and Mendoza (2018). The net foreign asset-to-GDP ratio in the left panel of
the bottom row has a sharp spike, which indicates a sudden reversal of capital inflows. The
last two panels show the average development of productivity and interest rate shocks that
cause sudden stops. Before sudden stops happen, productivity is high and the interest rate is
low, implying that the country is enjoying favorable shocks. During this period, the country
increases foreign borrowing and the bond holdings-to-GDP ratio is below its mean. When
these favorable shocks reverse to bad shocks of low productivity and a high interest rate, the
27Linear trend is created by taking log of 20-period series around each sudden stop (10 periods before and
after sudden stop respectively) and taking a linear trend of this log series.
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Figure 2.3: Sudden Stop Dynamics, Macro Variables






















































asset price declines and forces the borrowing constraint to bind. Then households are forced
to cut consumption, which reduces the asset price further, and the amplification mechanism
sets in motion. These developments of exogenous shocks and the subsequent endogenous
dynamics are all consistent with Mendoza (2010).
Next we examine the trade and growth dynamics, which are the novel features of our
model. Figure 2.4 plots the average dynamics of the key variables around sudden stops in
the model simulation. The first panel presents the average dynamics of imports and exports
of intermediate goods. We observe that imports decline much more than exports and stay
below the trend persistently, while exports are almost unaffected. A decline in imports occurs
because the final tradable producer in this country is constrained by the borrowing limit and
cannot buy as many intermediate goods as it wants, which reduces demand for intermediate
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Figure 2.4: Sudden Stop Dynamics, Trade and Growth
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goods. In contrast, foreign demand is not affected by sudden stops in this country, so that
exports are unaffected. This clear contrast in import and export dynamics during crises is at
least qualitatively consistent with the empirical facts documented in Alessandria, Kaboski,
and Midrigan (2010) and Alessandria, Pratap, and Yue (2015). The second panel shows
that the trade balance-to-GDP ratio improves in sudden stops, which is also in line with
the empirical fact. The bottom two panels show firms’ innovation and growth. The left
panel shows that domestic innovation rate drops by 8% and exporting innovation rate drops
by 6% in sudden stops. As a result, productivity growth rate drops sharply, which has a
persistent effect on the economy. This persistent negative effect on the economy is consistent
with empirical findings by Cerra and Saxena (2008) and Blanchard, Cerutti, and Summers
(2015).
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Figure 2.5: Sudden Stop Dynamics, Trade Margins
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Next we show how the extensive margins of trade react in sudden stops. Figure 2.5 plots
the key variables regarding the extensive margins of trade. The first panel shows that both
the real exchange rate and the domestic wage drop by 3% in sudden stops. A sharp real
depreciation is observed during sudden stops in the data as reported in Mendoza (2005).
The real depreciation and cheaper wage result in a decline in the relative marginal cost of
production for domestic firms compared to foreign firms. The second panel shows the relative
productivity of the foreign economy compared to the domestic economy. Since productivity
growth rate of the domestic economy drops in sudden stops, relative foreign productivity
jumps up during sudden stops, which implies larger foreign demand for exports. Because
of the decline in the relative marginal cost and larger foreign demand, profits from export
jump up by 9% above the trend as shown in the third panel. In contrast, a profit in the
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domestic market does not react much. This large gap between the domestic and exporting
profits in turn affects firms’investment decision. As shown in the third panel of Figure 2.4,
both of the domestic and exporting innovation rates drop in sudden stops, but the exporting
innovation rate drops less than the domestic innovation rate. This is because the profit from
export is expected to be higher than its trend after sudden stops, thus firms invest more in
exporting innovation compared to domestic innovation. These endogenous responses by firms
determine how the extensive margins of trades develop when a sudden stop happens. The
left panel in the bottom row of Figure 2.5 shows that the share of exporting lines gradually
increases after sudden stops, which is an expansion of the extensive margin of exports. This
occurs because profits from export are persistently higher after sudden stops, and firms invest
more in exporting innovation. This gradual expansion of the extensive margin of exports is
at least qualitatively in line with the empirical fact reported in Alessandria, Pratap, and Yue
(2015). The middle panel shows that the share of domestic product lines declines in sudden
stops. This occurs because the domestic innovation rate drops. The last panel shows that
the extensive margin of imports jumps up after sudden stops. Whether the extensive margin
of imports expands or shrinks in this model depends on the relative size of the changes in
the share of domestic lines and exporting lines. In this simulation a decline in the share of
domestic lines is larger than an increase in the share of exporting lines, thus the share of
importing lines increases. This expansion of the extensive margin of imports in crisis seems
not consistent with the empirical fact, and we plan to improve it.
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter develops a quantitative small-open-economy model with endogenous firm and
trade dynamics. Firms engage in two types of innovations, innovations to acquire new prod-
uct lines, and innovations to start exporting their products. These innovation activities
determine the extensive margins of imports and exports endogenously. The economy is also
subject to sudden stops of capital inflows in the form of an occasionally binding borrowing
constraint. We show that the model can capture the aggregate dynamics of output, consump-
tion, asset prices, and foreign debt quantitatively well. More importantly, firm and trade
dynamics of the model during sudden stops are in line with some of the empirical regularities:
firms’innovation rate drops sharply, which causes a persistent decline in productivity and
output; imports of goods decline substantially, while exports are almost unaffected; profits
for exports increase due to a large real depreciation and lower production costs; the exten-
sive margin of exports expand gradually after sudden stops. The model provides a tractable
framework to study optimal capital control policies in the context of endogenous firm and
trade dynamics. Because capital policies affect firm and trade dynamics and growth, it is
important to take these elements into account in designing optimal policies. We are planning
to pursue this direction for future research.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
Equilibrium and Stationarized Equilibrium
This section defines the equilibrium of the model economy and the stationarized equilibrium.
Equilibrium
Definition: The equilibrium of the model economy is defined by the initial states A0, R−1B−1,
K−1, θ−1, F−1, κ−1, the stochastic process {κt}∞t=0, the government policy rules {Tt, Vt}∞t=0
and the following:
1. Tradable goods producer: Given prices {rt,Wt, Rt}∞t=0 and the government policy rules
{Tt, Vt}∞t=0, {KDt ,Mt, Bt, IMt , Y Tt ,ΠTt , µt}∞t=0 satisfy (1.1), (1.3), (1.5), (1.7), (1.8).
(1.9), (1.29).
2. Foreign intermediate goods producing firms: Given prices {Wt}∞t=0 and tradable goods
output {Y Tt }∞t=0, {`Ft , ZFt , πFt , iFt , V Ft , σFt }∞t=0 satisfy (1.13), (1.15), (1.16), (1.17), (1.18),
(1.19).
3. Domestic intermediate goods producing firms: Given prices {Wt}∞t=0 and tradable goods
output {Y Tt }∞t=0, {`Dt , ZDt , πDt , iDt , V Dt , σDt }∞t=0 satisfy (1.12), (1.15), (1.16), (1.21), (1.23),
(1.24).
4. Foreign investors: {eFt , QFt }∞t=0 satisfy (1.20) (1.22).
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5. Non-tradable goods producer: Given prices {Wt, PNt }∞t=0, {Y Nt , LNt ,ΠNt }∞t=0 satisfy (1.31),
(1.32), (1.33).
6. Households: Given prices {rt,Wt, PNt }∞t=0, {Ct, CTt , CNt , Lt, Kt, ZEt , It, eEt , λt}∞t=0 satisfy
(1.25), (1.26), (1.34), (1.35), (1.36), (1.37), (1.38), (1.39), (1.40).
7. Foreign reserve: {Ft}∞t=0 follows the transition equation given by (1.41).
8. Aggregate variables {At, θt, dt}∞t=0 satisfy (1.27), (1.28), (1.30).
9. Prices {rt,Wt, PNt , Rt}∞t=0 and labor in tradable sector {LTt }∞t=0 satisfy (1.10), (1.42),
(1.43), (1.44), (1.45).
Stationarized Equilibrium
To stationarize the model, I divide the equilibrium conditions by aggregate productivity At. I
denote stationarized variables by the lower-case letters, and use gt to denote the productivity
growth rate At+1/At. I also make some arrangements and reduce the number of equations.
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The stationarized equilibrium is characterized by 33 variables {yTt , kt, gt, iMt , mt, LTt , θt,
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t ,
eDt , ft}∞t=0 and the above 33 equations, given the initial state R−1b−1/(1+g−1), k−1/(1+g−1),
θ−1, f−1/(1+g−1), κ−1, the government policy {τ t, vt}∞t=0, and the stochastic process {κt}∞t=0.
Numerical Solution




The solution method is a version of the policy function iteration, modified to deal with the
occasionally binding constraint. Below is the procedure to obtain the numerical solution.
1. I set the equally-spaced grid points for the endogenous state variables, foreign debt
Rt−1bt−1/(1 + gt−1), capital kt−1/(1 + gt−1), share of product lines owned by foreign
firms θt−1, and foreign reserve holdings ft−1/(1 + gt−1). I set 31 grid points for debt,
capital, and reserves. I set 5 grid points for the share of foreign product lines, since
the decision rules are close to linear over this state variable. There are also 2 states for
the borrowing limit κt.




t , and the
right-hand side of the Euler equation with respect to capital (RHSEE).
3. For each grid point, I do the following:
(a) I leave the 5 variables I have made guess for as unknown variables, and express all
the other endogenous variables in terms of the state variables and 5 unknowns. In
this process I first assume that the borrowing constraint is not binding and pro-
ceed. Later I check if the constraint is satisfied. If it is not satisfied, I recalculate
all the variables using the binding borrowing constraint. The other endogenous
variables, which include next-period state variables, are now functions of the 5
variables.
(b) Using multi-dimensional linear interpolation over the next-period state variables




t , RHSEE), I compute all the
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endogenous variables next period. I then calculate all the forward-looking expec-
tation terms, such as the right-hand side of the Euler equations and the value
functions.
(c) All the equilibrium conditions are now the functions of the initial 5 unknowns.
There are 4 equations I did not use in step (a), and the explicit expression for
RHSEE, thus 5 equations in total. I solve for the 5 unknowns using non-linear
solver.
4. I check the gap between the guess and the newly-obtained values for the 5 variables. If
they are close enough, I stop. If not, I update the guess by the newly-obtained values,
and go back to step 3. Repeat this process until the gap becomes suffi ciently small.
Accuracy of Solution
Next I present the accuracy of the numerical solution obtained by the above method. Follow-
ing Aruoba, Fernández-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramírez (2006), I compute the Euler equation
error of the solution. I use the Euler equation with respect to foreign borrowing, because
it is subject to the occasionally binding borrowing constraint, and thus likely to cause a
larger error. For each value of ψb and τ , I simulate the model for 50 periods with the initial
states used in the main analysis and stochastic shocks to the borrowing constraint. The
reason why I stop simulation at period 50 is because the economy after period 50 follows a
smooth path with no borrowing constraint binding, and thus errors are very small. I repeat
this simulation 10,000 times. For each period t in each simulation i, I compute the Euler
114
Figure A.1: Euler Equation Error







where cTt,i is tradable consumption computed directly from the decision rules, and c
T,EE
t,i is
computed by using the Euler equation with respect to foreign borrowing. Figure A.1 plots
the distribution of the Euler equation errors obtained by this method. As a reference, I plot
the distributions for the models with three different ψb that are used to study the effect of
the debt-elasticity of the spread on the optimal policy, with the corresponding optimal τ .
For each case, the average error is smaller than -4 and the maximum error is smaller than
-2, which are reasonably small compared to the literature. For other models with different
values of ψb and τ , the distributions of errors are similar.
Alternative Policy and Model
This section studies a bailout policy with an upper bound for the bailout size, and also the
model with slow productivity spillover to the non-tradable sector as robustness checks.
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Bailout Policy with Upper Bound
For the bailout policy studied in the main text, the size of a bailout is dependent on the
amount of private debt, thus there is a moral-hazard borrowing by private agents. This
potentially makes reserve accumulation less effective in depreciating the real exchange rate
and promoting growth. This section considers a bailout policy in which the size of a bailout
is independent of the amount of private debt. Specifically, I introduce an upper bound for
the size of a bailout in terms of a fixed fraction χ of tradable output Y Tt . The size of a
bailout Ṽt is then given as follows:
Ṽt = min{Vt, χY Tt }
where Vt is the size of a bailout for the baseline policy discussed in the main text. This
bailout policy implies that as the private debt becomes larger, the size of a bailout hits the
upper bound χY Tt and is independent of the amount of the private debt. To compare with the
baseline policy, Ṽt units of reserves are given to private agents upon bailouts. I try different
values for χ with different tax rate τ to see how the optimal τ is affected by the upper bound
χ. Figure A.2 presents the result. It shows that the higher upper bound monotonically gives
higher welfare. It also shows that as χ becomes larger, the welfare impact is not affected
by χ and becomes flat. This is because the size of a bailout is not likely to be larger than
the upper bound, thus the upper bound never binds. This is essentially the baseline bailout
policy in which there is no upper bound for the size of a bailout. This analysis therefore
shows that the baseline bailout policy with full rebating is better than the bailout policy
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Figure A.2: Bailout Policy with Upper Bound
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with an upper bound.
Slow Productivity Spillover to Non-Tradable Sector
This subsection considers the model with slow productivity spillover from the tradable sec-
tor to the non-tradable sector. This might potentially have an important impact on the
result, because slower productivity growth in the non-tradable sector compared to the trad-
able sector would cause real appreciation through the Balassa-Samuelson effect and might
mitigate the policy effectiveness in promoting growth and attracting FDI. One possible way







where ι is the parameter that governs the speed of productivity spillover. In terms of the
stationarized model, the relative productivity aNt = A
N











If aN−1 = 1 and ι = 0.9 for example, the relative productivity declines over time from 1 to
0.83 at the balanced growth path.
This specification, however, would require another state variable in the model and make
the numerical solution substantially diffi cult, given that there are 5 state variables in the






With this functional form, the relative productivity declines over time from 1 to some value
determined by the parameter ι′. I set the value for ι′ to match the long-run relative pro-
ductivity equal to 0.83, consistent with the case with ι = 0.9 for the original specification.
This gives ι′ = 0.27, and I adjust the other parameter values so that the long-run growth
rate g is the same as the baseline model. I then try different values for τ and find the value
that maximizes the expected utility of households. The result is presented in Figure A.3:
The optimal pace of reserve accumulation is still τ = 0.03, and the size of welfare gain is
very close to the baseline model. Therefore I conclude that slow productivity spillover to the
non-tradable sector does not change the main result of the chapter.
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Figure A.3: Slow Spillover to Non-Tradable Sector
























Policy Evaluation with Estimated FDI Entry Cost
This section presents an alternative analysis of reserve policy evaluation. In the main text, I
adjust the FDI entry cost parameters to target the FDI inflow-to-GDP ratio for each country
and evaluate the reserve policy. In this section, I estimate the FDI entry cost for each country
using Starting a Business Index from the World Bank’s Doing Business Surveys, and evaluate
each country’s pace of reserve accumulation.
Estimation of FDI Entry Cost
Starting a Business Index measures the effective cost of starting a new business in each
country by taking into account the minimum capital requirement, number of procedures,
and time and cost to start up a new business. The Index is focused on 100% domestically-
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Figure A.4: Correlation between FDI inflow and Starting a Business Index
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owned firms, but I use this Index as a proxy for cost to start a new business by foreign
investors. To validate that this Index can be used as a proxy for FDI entry cost, I first
show the correlation between the Index and the FDI inflow-to-GDP ratio across developing
countries. Since the Index is not available for China, I remove China from the sample in the
main text and use a sample of 21 developing countries. The Index takes a value between
0 and 100, and a higher value implies smaller cost to start a new business. The regression
result is presented in Figure A.4, with a band for one standard deviation. It is clear that
there is a positive correlation between the Index and FDI inflows. The slope is 0.071 with a
standard deviation 0.024 and a t-value 2.90. This result validates that Starting a Business
Index can be used as a proxy for FDI entry cost.
Given this result, I estimate the FDI entry cost parameter in the model using Starting a
Business Index. To do this, I assume that the congestion cost coeffi cient for FDI entry is a
120
function of the Index:
1/χFi = β0 + β1(Indexi)
β2
where χFi is the congestion cost coeffi cient for country i, and Indexi is the average of Starting
a Business Index for country i in 2004-2017. The reason for taking the inverse of χFi is because
higher Index implies smaller cost. I then choose β0, β1, β2 to minimize the sum of squared


















In doing this, I adjust the fixed entry cost CF to keep the fixed entry cost-to-profit ratio at
72%, and the step sizes σD and σF to have the same long-run growth rate as in the baseline
model for each country. As a result, I obtain β0 = 2.36, β1 = 33.1, and β2 = 10.9. Figure
A.5 plots the FDI inflow-to-GDP ratios using the estimated FDI entry cost χFi along with
the ratios in the data. The model captures the variation in the FDI inflow-to-GDP ratios
across countries relatively well, although there are some large gaps for countries with high
Index. The regression lines for the data and the model perfectly coincide.
Evaluation of Each Country’s Reserve Policy
Now I evaluate each country’s reserve policy using the estimated FDI entry cost. I follow the
same steps as in the main text, namely, I derive the optimal pace of reserve accumulation for
each country, and compare the welfare gain/loss between the actual pace and the optimal
pace. The results are presented in Figure A.6 and Table A.7. It seems from Figure A.6 that
there are more gaps between the actual pace and the optimal pace, compared to the analysis
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Figure A.5: FDI Inflows based on Estimated FDI Entry Cost
0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9





































































































































in the main text. It suggests that countries such as Ecuador, South Africa, Panama, and
Turkey, may have room for welfare improvement by accumulating reserves more quickly. But
Table A.1 shows that welfare gains for most countries are again close to the optimal level,
suggesting that most countries are still roughly in line with the optimal pace. The largest
discrepancy from the result in the main text is Turkey, which has a -0.05% welfare loss due
to over-accumulation in the main analysis, but now has a significant positive welfare gain
and still some room for welfare improvement by accumulating more quickly. This is because
Turkey has a small FDI inflow-to-GDP ratio at 1.04% in the data, while Starting a Business
Index is high at 84.7, and thus the estimated FDI inflow-to-GDP ratio is 4.02%, which is
four times as large as the actual ratio.
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Table A.4: Evaluation of Reserve Accumulation Pace
Country Accum. Pace (%) Welfare (%) Elasticity of Estimated
Actual Optimal Actual Optimal Spread FDI/GDP
Argentine 0.9 0.9 0.05 0.05 0.0736 2.22
Brazil 1.2 0.3 -0.03 0.02 0.0913 1.75
Chile 1.2 1.5 0.14 0.14 0.0913 3.59
Colombia 1.0 1.2 0.11 0.12 0.0736 3.10
Dominican Rep. 0.7 1.2 0.08 0.09 0.0736 2.75
Ecuador 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.02 0.0913 1.82
Egypt 2.3 1.2 0.06 0.10 0.0382 2.40
Hungary 2.5 2.4 0.24 0.24 0.0382 3.78
Indonesia 1.4 0.9 0.03 0.05 0.0382 1.76
Malaysia 4.3 2.7 0.17 0.25 0.0205 3.30
Mexico 0.8 1.5 0.13 0.15 0.0913 3.73
Panama 0.8 3.3 0.15 0.37 0.0382 5.01
Peru 2.5 0.9 -0.13 0.05 0.0913 2.40
Philippines 2.3 1.5 0.06 0.09 0.0205 1.88
Poland 1.6 1.2 0.08 0.09 0.0382 2.22
South Africa 0.8 1.8 0.10 0.15 0.0382 2.89
Thailand 3.4 2.7 0.23 0.25 0.0205 3.32
Tunisia 1.4 1.8 0.18 0.19 0.0559 3.61
Turkey 1.0 2.4 0.17 0.22 0.0559 4.02
Uruguay 1.4 0.9 0.02 0.05 0.0913 2.31
Venezuela 0.8 0.3 0.00 0.02 0.0913 1.73
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Proof of Linear Relations in Value Functions
This section shows the detailed procedure of the guess-and-verify method to prove the linear
relation in value functions for intermediate producing firms.
Foreign Firms
I guess the linear relation V Ft (n) = nV
F
t (1). I first work on the value of a foreign firm with
a single product line:
V Ft (1) = max
ZFt
{










P (j, 1, dt)Et
(
V Ft+1(1 + i− j)
))]}
There are 4 cases next period, depending on whether innovation is successful or not, and
replacement happens or not. Writing out all 4 cases and noting V Ft+1(0) = 0,
V Ft (1) = max
ZFt
{



































Using the linear relation V Ft+1(2) = 2V
F
t+1(1),
V Ft (1) = max
ZFt
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which is equation (1.18) in the main text. Next I work on the value of a foreign firm with n
product lines:
V Ft (n) = max
ZFt
{










P (j, n, dt)Et
(
V Ft+1(n+ i− j)
))]}
Using the linear relation V Ft+1(n+ i− j) = (n+ i− j)V Ft+1(1),
V Ft (n) = max
ZFt
{

























P (i, n, iFt )
n∑
j=0
P (j, n, dt)(n+ i− j)
]}
Inside of bracket can be written as follows:
n∑
i=0
P (i, n, iFt )
n∑
j=0
P (j, n, dt)(n+ i−j) = n+
n∑
i=0
P (i, n, iFt )i−
n∑
j=0
P (j, n, dt)j = n+ni
F
t −ndt
Note that the last two terms are just the expected number of successes for each binomial
process. Thus V Ft (n) can be written as follows:
V Ft (n) = max
ZFt
{
nπFt − nZFt +
1
RF







πFt − ZFt +
1
RF




= nV Ft (1)
This verifies that my initial guess V Ft (n) = nV
F
t (1) is correct.
126
Domestic Firms
I guess the linear relation V Dt (n) = nV
D
t (1). Again I first work on the value of a domestic
firm with a single product line, this time taking into account acquisition by foreign investors:













































There are now 6 cases next period: Whether innovation is successful or not, and whether
the product line is replaced, acquired, or survives. Writing out the second line,
1∑
i=0



















t+1(1 + i− j − k)
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Next, writing out the third line,
1∑
j=0

















Therefore V Dt (1) can be written as follows:
V Dt (1) = max
ZDt
{
πDt − ZDt +
[















which is equation (1.23) in the main text. Next I work on the value of a domestic firm with
n product lines:













































Using the linear relation V Dt+1(n+ i− j − k) = (n+ i− j − k)V Dt+1(1),
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The bracketed term in the second line is:
n∑
i=0
P (i, n, iDt )
n∑
j=0










(n+ i− j − k)
= n+ niDt − ndt −
n∑
j=0











= n+ niDt − ndt −
n∑
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The bracketed term in the last line is:
n∑
j=0
















Therefore V Dt (n) can be written as follows:



























= nV Dt (1)
This verifies that my initial guess V Dt (n) = nV
D
t (1) is correct.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Equilibrium and Stationarized Equilibrium
This section defines the equilibrium of the model economy and the stationarized equilibrium.
Factor Allocation
Before defining the equilibrium, we derive the expressions for asset and labor allocations.
First we show that the total cost for production RLt `t(i) + Wtht(i) is equal to production
yt(i) times the marginal cost. The latter can be written as:





1−α = α(RLt `t(i))
α(Wtht(i))
1−α






1− αWtht(i) = R
L
t `t(i) +Wtht(i) (B.1)
Thus production times the marginal cost is equal to the total cost.
Next, profit for a product line can be written as follows:
πt(i) = pt(i)yt(i)− (RLt `t(i) +Wtht(i)) = (pt(i)−MCt(i))yt(i)
Recall that the optimal price is equal to the marginal cost for the second-best rival. Here
we consider only the case in which the second-best rival is a domestic firm, but the case in
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which the rival is a foreign firm is similar. The rival’s marginal cost is (1 + σs) times the








RLt `t(i) = σ
s 1
1− αWtht(i)





RLt `t(i) = σ
s 1








This equation shows that the asset and labor input `t(i) and ht(i) are independent of pro-
ductivity at(i), and depends only on the type of product lines, s = D,X. Combining this


















−1, the stochastic process {εAt , εRt }∞t=0, and the following:
1. Tradable goods producer: Given prices {{pt(i)}1i=0, Qt, RLt }∞t=0, {{yt(i)1t=0, Bt, Lt, Y Tt , µt}∞t=0
satisfy (2.1), (2.3), (2.6), (2.5), (2.7).
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2. Domestic intermediate goods producing firms: Given prices {Wt, RLt }∞t=0 and trad-
able goods output {Y Tt , Y ∗t }∞t=0, {`st , hst , ZDt , ZXt , πst , ist , Vt(1, 0), Vt(0, 1)}∞t=0 satisfy (2.9),
(2.11), (2.17), (2.18), (2.19), (2.20), (2.21), (2.22), (B.2).
3. Non-tradable goods producer: Given prices {Wt, PNt }∞t=0, {Y Nt , LNt ,ΠNt }∞t=0 satisfy (2.29),
(2.30), (2.31).
4. Households: Given prices {Wt, PNt }∞t=0, {Ct, CTt , CNt , Ht, ZEt , et, λt}∞t=0 satisfy (2.23),
(2.24), (2.32), (2.33), (2.34), (2.35), (2.36).
5. Aggregate variables {At, θDt , θXt , dt}∞t=0 satisfy (2.25), (2.26), (2.27), (2.28).
6. Prices {Qt, RLt ,Wt, PNt }∞t=0 satisfy (2.37), (2.38), (2.39).
Stationarized Equilibrium
To stationarize the model, I divide the equilibrium conditions by aggregate productivity At. I
denote stationarized variables by the lower-case letters, and use gt to denote the productivity
growth rate At+1/At. I also make some arrangements and reduce the number of equations.




























































































vt(1, 0) = π
D
t − zDt − zXt +
[
iDt + (1− dt)(1− iXt )
]
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In this section we sketch the numerical solution method. The solution method is a version
of the policy function iteration, modified to deal with the occasionally binding constraint.
Below is the procedure to obtain the numerical solution.
1. We set the equally-spaced grid points for the endogenous state variables, foreign debt
exp(εRt )Rbt−1/(1 + gt−1), share of domestic product lines θ
D
t−1, share of exporting prod-
uct lines θXt−1, relative productivity of foreign countries over the domestic country
a∗t = A
∗





2. For each grid point, we set the initial guess for five variables: cTt , Et(Λt,t+1vt+1(1, 0)),
Et(Λt,t+1vt+1(0, 1)), LDt , qt.
3. For each grid point, we do the following:
(a) We leave the five variables we have made guess for as unknown variables, and
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express all the other endogenous variables in terms of the state variables and five
unknowns. In this process we first assume that the borrowing constraint is not
binding and proceed. Later we check if the constraint is satisfied. If it is not
satisfied, we recalculate all the variables using the binding borrowing constraint.
The other endogenous variables, which include next-period state variables, are
now functions of the five variables.
(b) Using multi-dimensional linear interpolation over the next-period state variables
and the guess for the five variables (cTt , Et(Λt,t+1vt+1(1, 0)), Et(Λt,t+1vt+1(0, 1)),
LDt , qt), we compute all the endogenous variables next period. we then calculate
all the forward-looking expectation terms, such as the right-hand side of the Euler
equations and the value functions.
(c) All the equilibrium conditions are now the functions of the initial five unknowns.
There are five equations we did not use in step (a), thus five equations in total.
We solve for the five unknowns using non-linear solver.
4. We check the gap between the guess and the newly-obtained values for the five variables.
If they are close enough, we stop. If not, we update the guess by the newly-obtained
values, and go back to step 3. Repeat this process until the gap becomes suffi ciently
small.
We check the accuracy of the numerical solution in the same way as in Chapter 1, namely
using the Euler equation error. Because the model in this chapter is a business cycle model
rather than a transition model as in Chapter 1, we simulate the model for 100,000 periods
with stochastic shocks and compute the Euler equation error for each period. Figure B.1
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Figure B.1: Euler Equation Error
plots the distribution of the Euler equation errors obtained by this method. The average
error is smaller than -4 and the maximum error is smaller than -2, which are reasonably
small compared to the literature.
Proof of Linear Relations in Value Functions
This section shows the detailed procedure of the guess-and-verify method to prove the linear
relation in value functions for intermediate producing firms. We guess the linear relation
Vt(n
D, nX) = nDVt(1, 0) + n
XVt(0, 1) and prove it. We first work on the value of a firm with
a single domestic product line:



















k, 1− j, iXt
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Using the linear relation, the summations in the second line can be written as follows:
1∑
i=0










k, 1− j, iXt
)















k, 1− j, iXt
)
Et [Λt,t+1[(1 + i− j − k)Vt+1(1, 0) + kVt+1(0, 1)]]
)
= Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(1, 0)]
1∑
i=0
P (i, 1, iDt )
1∑
j=0





k, 1− j, iXt
)




P (i, 1, iDt )
1∑
j=0





k, 1− j, iXt
)
(k)
= (iDt + (1− dt)(1− iXt ))Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(1, 0)] + (1− dt)iXt Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(0, 1)]
Therefore we have:





πDt − ZDt − ZXt
+
(
iDt + (1− dt)(1− iXt )
)
Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(1, 0)] + (1− dt)iXt Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(0, 1)]
}
Similarly, we can show that the value of a firm with a single exporting line is given as follows:





t − ZDt + iDt Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(1, 0)] + (1− dt)Et [Λt,t+1Vt+1(0, 1)]
}
which is equation (2.19) and (2.20) in the main text. Next I work on the value of a firm with
general nD domestic lines and nX exporting lines:
Vt(n








P (i, nD + nX , iDt )
nD∑
j=0
P (j, nD, dt)
nD−j∑
k=0
P (k, nD − j, iXt )
nX∑
m=0




D + i− j − k, nX + k −m)
]}
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Using the linear relation in the value function,
Vt(n








P (i, nD + nX , iDt )
nD∑
j=0
P (j, nD, dt)
nD−j∑
k=0
P (k, nD − j, iXt )
nX∑
m=0
P (m,nX , dt)(n




P (i, nD + nX , iDt )
nD∑
j=0
P (j, nD, dt)
nD−j∑
k=0
P (k, nD − j, iXt )
nX∑
m=0
P (m,nX , dt)(n
X + k −m)
The second line can be written as follows:
Et[Λt,t+1Vt+1(1, 0)](n
D + (nD + nX)iDt − nDdt − nD(1− dt)iXt
The third line can be written as follows:
Et[Λt,t+1Vt+1(0, 1)](n
X + nD(1− dt)iXt − nXdt
Therefore Vt(nL, nH) can be written as follows::
Vt(n




{nDπDt + nX(πXt + π∗t )− (nD + nX)ZDt − nDZXt
+ Et[Λt,t+1Vt+1(1, 0)](n
D + (nD + nX)iDt − nDdt − nD(1− dt)iXt
+ Et[Λt,t+1Vt+1(0, 1)](n






{nDπDt + nX(πXt + π∗t )− (nD + nX)ZDt − nDZXt
+nD
{








= nDVt(1, 0) + n
XVt(0, 1)
This verifies that the initial guess Vt(nD, nX) = nDVt(1, 0) + nXVt(0, 1) is correct.
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Firm Size Distribution
This section shows the law of motion for the share of each firm size and how to derive the
firm size distribution. Each firm is characterized by the number of domestic and exporting
lines it owns, (nD, nX). The law of motion for the firm size (nD, nX) is the formula that
gives us the measure (number) of firms that own (nD, nX) given the firm size distribution
in the previous period. Let δt(nD, nX) denote the measure of firms that own nD domestic
lines and nX exporting lines at period t. Because the total measure of intermediate goods
is one and each firm owns at least one product line, the measure of firms is between 0 and
1, i.e. δt(nD, nX) ∈ [0, 1] ∀t, nD, nX . In order for a firm to become a firm with (nD, nX) in
the next period, there are some conditions to be satisfied. For example, a firm with (i, j)
at period t − 1 can own at most 2i + j domestic lines, because this is the case in which all
domestic innovations (i+j) are successful, all exporting innovations fail, and no replacement
on domestic lines happens. So, if a firm owns (i, j) that satisfies 2i+j < nD, this firm cannot
become a firm with (nD, nX) in the next period.
Let (i, j) denote the number of domestic and exporting lines that a firm owns at period
t − 1. Let (k,m) denote the number of successes in domestic innovation and exporting
innovation respectively. Then consider a case in which this firm becomes a firmwith (nD, nX).
This implies that the number of replacement on domestic and exporting lines, denoted by




nD domestic lines next period
nX exporting lines next period
i domestic lines this period
j exporting lines this period
k successes in domestic innovation
m successes in exporting innovation
rD replacements on domestic lines
rX replacements on exporting lines
These variables need to satisfy the following conditions:
• Number of successful innovations is limited by the number of existing lines:
(1) k ≤ i+ j
(2) m ≤ i
• The sum of exporting innovation and replacements on domestic lines is limited by the
number of existing domestic lines. The number of replacements on exporting lines is
limited by the number of existing exporting lines:
(3) rD +m ≤ i
(4) rX ≤ j
• Minimum necessary number of successful innovations to achieve (nD, nX):
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(5) k ≥ nD − i
(6) m ≥ nX − j
• Given i, minimum necessary number of exporting lines j to achieve (nD, nX):
(7) j ≥ nD − 2j
(8) j ≥ nX − i
• Non-negativity constraints:
(9) i ≥ 0
(10) j ≥ 0
(11) k ≥ 0
(12) m ≥ 0
(13) rD ≥ 0
(14) rX ≥ 0
As in the main text, let P (i, n, p) denote the binomial probability for i successes in n trials
with the success probability p. Incorporating all the conditions above and some additional
conditions to keep the consistency across different conditions, the law of motion for firm size

























P (k, i+ j, iDt )P (m,n
D +m− k, iXt )P (i+ k − nD −m, i, dt)P (j +m− nX , j, dt)
143
where I+(x) is the smallest integer that is equal to or greater than x. The special case is
(nD, nX) = (1, 0), because there is new firm entry. In this case et is added to the right-hand
side.
To derive the firm size distribution at the balanced growth path, we use the values at
the balanced growth path for new entry, innovation and replacement rates et, iDt , i
X
t , dt, and
iterate this law of motion for large enough (nD, nX) until the distribution converges for every
firm size. For the parameter values used in the main text, the firm distribution is not very
dispersed and more than 90% of firms own only one product line either domestic or foreign.
But still there is heterogeneity in the sense that 57% of firms are a single domestic line and
35% are a single exporting line. In future research we plan to calibrate the parameters to
match the key firm-level moments using this formula.
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